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Economic conditions and government regulations can promote, discourage, support,
shape, or distort both corporate and individual decisions about culture, communication,
and creativity. The media, entertainment, and telecommunications industries demon-
strate these economic and legal effects most directly and vividly. When the structure
of the radio industry changes such that a single companyonce limited to owning forty
stationscomes to control over twelve hundred stations, the resulting evolution implicates
more than just industrial-organization economics. Will larger companies play jazz less
often? If so, how will jazz musicians respond in their compositions and song selections?
Should the employment of news reporters decline as a result of media mergers, issues
beyond labor markets arise. How might political discourse change? What happens when
newsrooms contain fewer people’s perspectives and attitudes? And if copyright law pro-
hibits sampling, more than legal doctrines will change. Will law confine the creative
possibilities of hip-hop, electronic, or other sample-based music? Does expanding in-
tellectual property rights with the music industry in mind affect the fields of technology,
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science, or literature?
With this dissertation I hope to contribute economic, statistical, and legal analysis
to the debates over important questions like those I have mentioned above. Quantifying
media ownership concentration and measuring its effects provides necessary context
to policy discussions. Describing the complexities of the legal environment does the
same. But alongside my economic and legal analysis of the regulation of the media,
entertainment, and telecommunications industries, I also recognize the perspectives and
concerns of those in other disciplines. A quantitative economic model can shed light
on, but cannot produce definitive answers to, questions about how regulation affects,
and how it should seek to affect, creativity and communication. My interdisciplinary
approach aims to fit my economic and legal analysis like a puzzle piece into broader
discussions.
More specifically this dissertation uses the radio industry and the recorded music
industry as primary examples of how government regulates communication and enter-
tainment industries in the United States. I am particularly interested in how changes in
media regulation and copyright law have affected the programming choices of media
companies; the situations of media, entertainment, and telecommunications workers;
and the creative and communicative options available to musicians. I examine two spe-
cific sets of policies. First, and most extensively, I study the easing of longstanding
restrictions on the number of radio stations a single corporation may own. Second, I
address the effects of tightened restrictions on music sampling, that is, the use of other
creators’ sound recordings to construct new musical works.
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Until the mid-1980s, control of the radio industry had been diffuse because of limits
on both national and local ownership of radio stations. Gradually, Congress and the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) began to ease those restrictions, culmi-
nating in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which eliminated the national cap of
forty stations per company and raised the local cap from a maximum of four stations
per company to eight. These regulatory changes provide an opportunity to measure, in
a statistically valid way, the causal effect of increasing ownership consolidation. To im-
plement a limit on local radio ownership, the FCC had to define the geography of a local
market. In other words, the agency must determine whether the “Detroit radio market”
includes Detroit within its city limits, the entirety of southeastern Michigan, or some
other geographic area. In 1992, the FCC had changed its method for market definition
to a complicated formula based on how each radio stations signal coverage areathe ge-
ographic area reached by the signal coming from that stations broadcast toweroverlaps
with other stations’ areas. This formula permitted ownership to consolidate to differ-
ent extents in different cities because of differences in geographic features (for example
lakes, peninsulas, and mountains) and the resultantly different patterns in the placement
of broadcast towers. In econometric terminology, this situation presents a plausible
“natural experiment”an opportunity to isolate non-market factors that manipulated con-
solidation, so that one can measure the market effects of consolidation separately from
the effects of those outcomes feeding back into consolidation. I focus on how consolida-
tion affects programming variety; overall radio listenership; and the employment levels
and wages of disk jockeys, news reporters, and broadcast technicians.
3
Copyright law has recently altered its restrictions on musicians who wish to engage
in sampling, the use of other creators’ sound recordings to construct new musical works.
These restrictions include recent judicial decisions like Bridgeport Music v. Dimension
Films (6th Circuit, 2005), which found copyright infringement in the unauthorized use
of a two-second sample used in the background of a song. More generally, expansions
in copyright law, such as the 1976 Copyright Act’s expansion of the exclusive right
“to prepare derivative works,” have made direct creative borrowing more expensive and
occasionally impossible.
In this dissertation I explore several legal and economic issues implicated by this pol-
icy problem, including copyright law’s discrimination between certain categories of cre-
ation, labor-economic choices presented to musicians who consider sampling, and var-
ious approaches to reform. Systematic data on sampling activity and sample-licensing
fees are not currently available, making statistical analysis infeasible. Given that limi-
tation, this paper outlines an economic model to highlight the fact that the creations of
others are a key input into new creations. The model thus illustrates certain key tradeoffs
between providing incentives to create and promoting access to creative works, not just
for the public but for other musicians to use as inputs.
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Chapter 2
FCC Regulation and Increased Ownership
Concentration in the Radio Industry
2.1 Introduction
For decades Congress has set a limit on the number of radio stations that one company
can own within a local radio market. But for more than eight years after Congress’s
most recent statute dealing with radio ownership limits,1 policymakers, researchers, and
the general public did not know the answer to a deceptively simple question: “How
many radio stations may one company own in one city?” If it is an important policy to
limit the concentration of ownership of the public airwaves, then how could radio policy
be so opaque? And how could the FCC enforce such a policy? On the other hand, if
radio-ownership limits have outlived their usefulness (say, because of the proliferation
of new communications technologies), how could anyone be sure of that obsolescence
if the limits themselves remain unknown?
To work toward a better understanding of radio policy over the last decade, this
1Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
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paper outlines a methodology for determining the FCC’s local radio ownership limits.
The paper reports the calculated ownership limits for only the 100 largest metropolitan
areas in the U.S., but the study covers 289 metropolitan areas. Calculating the FCC’s
radio ownership limits allows for an analysis of how radio firms responded to that policy.
As it happens, in almost no metropolitan areas do radio firms’ station holdings equal or
exceed the limits, suggesting that constraints other than government regulation are at
play.
Another important finding I document in the paper is that FCC radio policy varied
considerably from city to city—much more so than researchers or policymakers have
previously understood. While that variation is curious in and of itself, it is also use-
ful variation for a statistically minded researcher. Because the variation relates to the
historical placement of radio towers and the complex geometry of how radio stations’
signal coverage areas intersect—that is, because the variation is not related to market
forces—the FCC’s regulation of radio could provide a natural experiment to study the
effects of increased ownership concentration.
I find that the calculated local ownership limits are strongly correlated with mea-
sures of ownership concentration, justifying the use of radio policy since 1996 as a sort
of experiment. The results from that experiment suggest that increased concentration,
isolated from other market phenomena, causes an increase in nominal programming
variety, as measured by programming format names, as well as an increase in advertis-
ing revenue. At the same time, I find that increased concentration has no effect on the
amount of news programming on the radio. But I also estimate that increased concen-
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tration has no effect on radio listening and to push some listeners from commercial to
noncommercial stations.
The story of radio regulation, particularly the FCC’s contribution to it, and the re-
sulting increase in ownership concentration has more than just economic lessons. Radio
policy itself continues to be controversial, as the FCC continues to review its media
ownership rules as of this writing. My findings help to explain what one can and cannot
conclude about the FCC’s quasi-antitrust regime for media based on the recent history of
radio. Moreover, the recent history of radio regulation provides a case study for admin-
istrative law, particular questions regarding the administrative process. At first blush, the
FCC’s extra-permissive regulations on radio firms seem like strong evidence for public
choice or capture theory, but the reality is more complex, especially because the FCC
itself has closed the loophole of sorts that I study in this paper.
Section 2.2 provides a brief overview of the competing theories regarding media
concentration. Section 2.3 describes the relevant statutes and regulations that govern
radio-ownership policy. Section 2.4 explains how to calculate the local ownership limit
under the FCC regulations that were in place from 1992 to 2004 and reports the results.
Section 2.5 concerns the relationship between the local ownership limits and ownership
concentration. Section 2.6, in turn, concerns the relationship between ownership con-
centration and various radio outcomes like programming variety, exploiting the natural
experiment created by the FCC’s implementation of the local ownership limit. Section
2.7 discusses the legal and policy implications. Section 2.8 concludes.
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2.2 Media Concentration
This section briefly outlines the two major perspectives in the debate over media con-
centration. Both perspectives contain multiple theories and variations. For the purposes
of this paper, what matters is that the two theories make opposite predictions about the
effect of increased concentration of radio-station ownership.
2.2.1 Critiques of Media Concentration
Critics of media concentration often argue that concentration leads to more homoge-
neous programming. A simple economic theory of the negative effects of media con-
centration might focus on the cost side. Firms that own multiple radio stations may find
it less costly to offer the same or at least similar programming on all of their stations.
More developed critiques focus on the likelihood of monopolistic or oligopolistic me-
dia firms to adequately serve as government watchdogs or to reflect a diverse array of
viewpoints.2 Many theories are possible; what they have in common is a prediction that
ownership concentration will frustrate the goal of diverse programming.
Previous research has found that common ownership of radio stations in different
metropolitan areas leads to more similar playlists on music stations.3 Such evidence
focuses on particular radio firms rather than market-wide effects, as this paper does. The
rationale for limiting concentration is to produce better results for the radio listeners in
a given market; more diverse offerings from a particular firm are merely a means to that
2See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 176–77 (2002) (describing
liberal pluralist critiques of media concentration).
3See ANDREW SWEETING, TOO MUCH ROCK AND ROLL? STATION OWNERSHIP, PROGRAM-
MING, AND LISTENERSHIP IN THE MUSIC RADIO INDUSTRY (working paper, Jan. 15, 2006).
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end.
Important parts of the case for media-ownership regulation, however, do not concern
outcomes in media markets. For instance, many critiques of media concern language,
discourse, and meaning, rather than measurement of economic variables.4 Many critics
of media concentration value diversity of ownership in and of itself.5 For those subscrib-
ing to such theories, this paper’s analysis (in Section 2.5) of whether FCC regulation led
to increased ownership concentration will hold the most interest. But this paper will also
test (in Section 2.6) whether media concentration leads to poor market-wide outcomes.
2.2.2 Economic Theories of Concentration’s Effects
The most famous and influential theory about the benefits of media concentration comes
from Peter Steiner’s famous 1952 paper.6 Comparing the U.S. model of mandating
a market structure of monopolistic competition by limiting station ownership to the
U.K. model of state-run monopoly, Steiner argued (somewhat counter-intuitively) that
monopoly would provide more variety in programming.
A numerical example best illustrates Steiner’s point. Suppose that a small town
has only five radio stations, by decree of the FCC, which restricts radio licenses. And
suppose that the five most popular programming formats are Country, Rock, Talk, Adult
Contemporary, and Sports, which have 100, 60, 40, 25, and 10 listeners associated with
4See, e.g., NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN THE AGE
OF SHOW BUSINESS (1985).
5Andrew Jay Schwartzman et al., The Legal Case for Diversity in Broadcast Ownership, in THE
FUTURE OF MEDIA: RESISTANCE AND REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 149-161 (Robert McChesney
et al., eds. 2005).
6Peter O. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability of Competition in Radio
Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. ECON. 194 (1952).
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them, respectively. A monopolist who owns all five stations will offer all five formats.
But consider instead a market with two competitors. Competitors would rather split
the Country format two ways (garnering 50 listeners each) than offer the Talk format
(garnering 40 listeners). Similarly, the competitiors would rather split the Rock listeners
(30 listeners each) than offer Adult Contemporary (25 listeners). The competitors would
only offer three formats on their five stations, with duplication in Country and Rock.
Thus, Steiner argued, monopoly serves consumer welfare in broadcast industries better
than competition does. See Appendix A for a more formal description of Steiner’s
model.
Another theory would relate to Hotelling’s model of product differentiation or Downs’s
theory of the median voter.7 The basic idea there is a race to the middle—two competi-
tors considering a spectrum of programming choices both choose the “median” pro-
gramming format, in some not-wholly-defined sense. A monopolist, on the other hand,
would spread out its programming offerings across the spectrum. Other economic in-
centives, however, could come into play. A monopolist might prefer to shut down some
outlets to save money. Or a monopolist might make its offerings more similar to deter
new entrants from seizing the middle of the spectrum. This more complicated story,
echoed in more detailed theoretical works,8 suggests that incentives for radio firms to
offer diverse programming point in opposite directions. This reinforces the need to
measure what happens and test the theories.
7Steven T. Berry and Joel Waldfogel, Do Mergers Increase Product Variety? Evidence from Radio
Broadcasting, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1009 (2001).
8See, e.g., Simon P. Anderson & Stephen Coate, Market Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare Analy-
sis, 72 REV. ECON. STUD. 947 (2005).
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2.2.3 The Need for a Policy Experiment
Both detractors and supporters of media concentration have generally lacked quantita-
tive evidence that allows for sound causal inference. By that I mean that ownership
concentration is an economic variable simultaneously determined along with other eco-
nomic variables, such as programming choices. Econometricians refer to this problem
as endogeneity bias or simply endogeneity. Without a way to isolate concentration and
manipulate it independently, it is not possible to know whether increased concentra-
tion causes changes in programming or vice versa. One contribution of this paper is
to provide a causal test of the competing theories of media concentration’s harms and
benefits.
Statistical considerations, or even quantitative considerations more generally, will
not and should not dominate the policy debate over media concentration. As noted
above, many of the critiques of media concentration, especially, find cause for alarm
in media concentration in and of itself. Others, like Ronald Coase, find fault with the
institution of media regulation itself.9 But a test of whether increased concentration
causes harms or benefits in terms of various market outcomes has value: first, to answer
questions for those who do focus on outcomes; and, second, to refine our understanding
of how media markets operate, allowing for more nuanced critiques of concentration or
regulation. The next four sections lay the groundwork for and describe the results of the
test I propose in an attempt to meet those objectives.
9R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959) (questioning the
FCC’s scarcity rationale for limiting station licenses and suggesting a tie to censorship).
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2.3 FCC Regulation of Radio Ownership Since 1992
Economic theories like Steiner’s, along with a general trend toward relaxing regulation
of industry, led to a legislative and administrative overhaul of radio regulation begin-
ning in the 1980s. These changes eliminating many regulations, such as the Fairness
Doctrine, and relaxed many others, such as the restrictions on media ownership.
This paper focuses on the Local Radio Ownership Rule, which sets a numerical
limit on the number of commercial AM and FM stations one company can own in a
“radio market.” Before 1992, that limit was 2 stations in each market. In 1992, the FCC
increased that limit to 3 stations (in markets with less than 15 stations) or 4 stations (in
all other markets), with the additional restriction that no firm could own 50 percent of
the stations in a market.10 Later, Congress increased the limit even further. But before I
reach that part of the story, I have to explain how the FCC defines a “radio market” for
purposes of the local radio ownership limit.
2.3.1 The Signal Contour Market Definition
The FCC chose a new, technical, and complicated method of defining radio markets in
1992. To see this, one can start by considering a straightforward method. The Arbitron
Company surveys radio listeners and provides the industry with quarterly or biannual
ratings. To do so, Arbitron divides the country into “Arbitron markets,” which roughly
correspond to metropolitan areas. Arbitron assigns each station to one home market.
Firms in the industry use the ratings within Arbitron markets to measure themselves and
10FCC, “Revision of Radio Rules and Policies,” 57 Fed. Reg. 42,701 (Sept. 16, 1992).
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to help sell their airtime to advertisers.
The FCC could have applied the local radio ownership limits to Arbitron markets.
The rule would involve straightforward statements like the following: “These 23 stations
make up the Wichita, Kansas ‘market’ for purposes of the local radio ownership rule.
So, under the law, one company can own 4 out of those 23 stations.”
But the FCCs method of market definition was not so simple. Instead, the FCC con-
sidered each station to be a member of multiplesometimes hundreds ofdistinct markets,
based on each stations broadcast coverage areas, or“signal contours.” A cluster of sta-
tions with mutually overlapping signal contours defined a “radio market” for purposes
of the FCC’s application of the local radio ownership limits. For example, if stations
A, B, C, and D had overlapping signal contours, but their area of intersection did not
intersect any other stations’ signal contours, then the cluster A–B–C–D constituted a
radio market. The FCC would then apply the numerical limits on ownership to those
radio markets. I refer to markets defined in this way as “merger-scrutinized clusters”
or “FCC-clusters” to differentiate them from Arbitron markets. (See Appendix B for a
more formal explanation.)
Two-sentence explanations would not suffice under the signal-contour market defi-
nition. This method requires analyzing the 23 stations in Wichita, for example, based
on the peculiar geometry of the 23 stations’ signal contours. One must determine which
stations signal contours overlap with which other stations signal contours, and in what
specific ways. (Think of a giant Venn diagram, with circles representing the radio sta-
tions broadcast areas for a given signal strength.)
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The regulation applying to any given group of stations took the form of a series of
constraints like the following:“in the merger-scrutinized cluster made up of stations A,
B, C, and D, one company may own two stations”; “in the merger-scrutinized cluster
made up of stations A, B, E, F, G, and H, one company may own three stations”; and
so on. The stations in a given metropolitan area, rather than being subject to a single,
easily understandable constraint on radio-station ownership, would instead be subject to
potentially hundreds of constraints. Only an expert engineering firm, using geographic
signal-contour maps for every relevant station in the area, could discern what the local
ownership limits were in each city.
Radio firms can take advantage of the signal-contour market definition, where it
results in a more permissive local ownership limit, by purchasing particular stations
within a given city or metropolitan area. That is the main way radio firms can use
the system strategically. Firms cannot change the wattage or antenna direction of their
stations at will; the FCC controls that process as part of its station-licensing regime.
During the period I study in this paper, fewer than 250 stations, or less than 2 percent
of all stations, underwent a “major adjustment to a license” according to the FCC’s
engineering database. So radio firms are left to use mergers and acquisitions to optimize
their station holdings.
2.3.2 Details Allowing More Mergers
Two additional details of the signal-contour market definition are important. First, to
define a signal contour, one must pick a particular signal-strength for which to draw
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the contour line on a map. Like contour maps of mountains showing rings of particular
altitude, radio stations’ signal-coverage areas have many signal contours. The FCC
chose a particularly strong signal strength—70 decibel units, or dBUs—to apply the
signal-contour market definition. The stronger the signal, the smaller the area contained
within the contour, just as the highest altitude of a mountain is the smallest circle on a
map.
Second, to apply the sliding scale of the local ownership limit (as of 1992, to ap-
ply a limit of 3 versus 4), one must know the “size” of the radio market—how many
stations are in it (under the 1992 rules, to determine whether there are more or less
than 15 stations in the market). A simple method for calculating size would be to make
size equal to the number of stations making up the merger-scrutinized cluster. But the
FCC counted size differently. Under the signal-contour market definition, the size of
a merger-scrutinized cluster includes every station that intersects at any point with the
stations in the cluster. But, despite the size calculation, the local ownership limit only
applies to the stations that define the cluster (hence the term “merger-scrutinized clus-
ter”).
For example, suppose station A in cluster A–B–C–D intersects 12 other stations that
were not members of that particular cluster. Suppose further that B, C, and D only
intersect each other and station A. Then the “size” of cluster A–B–C–D would be 16, or
4 plus 12. In that example, under the 1992 local ownership rule, instead of an ownership
limit of 1 station (less than 50 percent of 4 stations), cluster A–B–C–D would have an
ownership limit of 4 stations, since the market has a “size” of 16 stations. Under the
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FCC’s method of calculating size, one company could own all 4 stations: A, B, C, and
D.
While the signal-contour market definition is arcane and might make one’s head
ache, that is part of the point. The bottom line is that, in 1992, the FCC implemented its
newly relaxed local radio ownership limits in a highly complex manner—with important
consequences. Details like the 70-dBU contour and the odd manner of calculating a
cluster’s “size” translated the relaxed local ownership limits into what seems like an
even more permissive regulation on radio companies. The results presented in Section
2.4 will bear out that impression.
2.3.3 The Telecommunications Act of 1996
The Telecommunications Act brought major changes to radio regulation and the struc-
ture of the radio industry. Most dramatically, it completely eliminated the National Ra-
dio Ownership Rule, which had previously limited radio firms to 40 stations nationwide,
with small exceptions for ethnic-minority-owned firms. This opened up the possibility
for truly national radio firms. At its peak in 2002, Clear Channel Communications (the
largest radio firm) came to own 1240 stations—31 times the previous maximum allowed.
Congress also relaxed the local radio ownership limit in 1996, instituting the slid-
ing scale described in Table 2.1. The total cap and the AM and FM sub-caps apply
simultaneously—that is, no firm can exceed any part of the local ownership limit in a
radio market.
Eliminating the national cap also affected local markets, since regional and national
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companies no longer faced restrictions on additional markets in which they could pur-
chase stations. As a result, a wave of mergers and acquisitions, transactions large and
small, followed the Telecommunications Act of 1996.11
Despite the elimination of the national limit and the relaxation of the local limit, it
is something of a misnomer to call the recent changes in radio policy “deregulatory.”
The FCC continues to control entry into the radio industry. With the FCC allowing only
100 to 200 new full-power radio stations nationwide each year, incumbent radio firms
benefit from the entry-restrictions that remain.
2.3.4 The Interaction Between Ownership Limits and Market Definition
Congress stepped into the arena of radio regulation with the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, specifying new numerical limits for station ownership in a local radio market.
But Congress did not define the term “radio market,” leaving the FCC to determine
the actual substance of the government’s restrictions on ownership concentration in the
radio industry. The FCC used its signal-contour market definition to apply the changes
to the local radio ownership limit contained in the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
But the signal-contour market definition is highly complex and, in practice, unpre-
dictable. The signal-contour method treated seemingly similar cities, with similar num-
bers of radio stations, in very different ways, giving one city a relatively stringent limit
and another city a relatively lax one. Moreover, the signal-contour method, when the
local ownership limits increased, affected different cities differently. In other words,
11See generally PETER DICOLA, FALSE PREMISES, FALSE PROMISES: A QUANTI-
TATIVE HISTORY OF OWNERSHIP CONSOLIDATION IN THE RADIO INDUSTRY (2006) at
http://www.futureofmusic.org/research/radiostudy06.cfm.
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the signal-contour market definition interacted with the increased local ownership limits
to make it unpredictable how and where the effective limits on radio ownership would
increase and by how much relative to other cities. In 1995, on the eve of the Telecom-
munications Act, radio policy already differed from city to city for reasons related to the
geometry of radio stations’ signal-coverage area. But in 1996, with the passage of the
Telecommunications Act, radio policy changed in even more complex and unpredictable
ways.
2.3.5 Closing the Loophole, with Grandfathering
After a few years with the signal-contour market definition and the relaxed local owner-
ship limits of the Telecommunications Act, the FCC began to see administrative cases
like In re Applications of Pine Bluff Radio.12 In that case, Seark Radio was about to
acquire 3 new stations such that it would own or control 6 out of the 11 stations in or
near Pine Bluff, Arkansas. Bayou Broadcasting challenged the proposed transaction, on
the ground that no firm could own more than half the stations in a market. Yet, under
the signal-contour market definition, Pine Bluff was actually split into 6 markets—and
in a way that allowed Seark to own 6 stations legally. (Figures 2.1 through 2.4 provide
signal-contour maps of the relevant radio stations and the 3 FCC-markets of Pine Bluff.)
Pine Bluff and other instances of seemingly odd results under the signal-contour
market definition led the FCC to begin considering a move to the Arbitron market defi-
nition.13 In September 2004, the FCC finally made the switch to using Arbitron markets.
1214 FCC Rcd. 6594 (1999).
13See FCC, “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Broadcast Services; Radio Stations, Television Stations,”
65 Fed. Reg. 82,305 ¶¶2–4 (Dec. 28, 2000).
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But in doing so the FCC grandfathered the station holdings of radio firms that had taken
advantage of the signal-contour market definition to exceed the current limits, applied
using Arbitron’s market definition.14
2.4 Calculating the FCC’s Limits on Local Radio Ownership
This section applies the local ownership limits using the signal-contour market defini-
tion, translating those regulations into understandable numerical limits on radio-station
ownership.
2.4.1 A Puzzle
Immediately after the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the signal-contour market defi-
nition had not made its presence felt. But by 2002, radio companies appeared to exceed
the local ownership rule—if one (mistakenly)thought that “radio market” meant “Arbi-
tron market.” For instance, in the Los Angeles Arbitron market, Clear Channel briefly
owned 18 stations, far more than the apparent limit of 8 stations (for a market with 45 or
more stations). In the Raleigh-Durham market, a company called Curtis Media owned
10 stations, when the apparent limit was 7. But these firms’ station holdings were not in
violation of FCC regulation. Rather, the market definition was more complicated.
Previous studies applied the local radio ownership limits using Arbitron markets
rather than the FCC-clusters of the signal-contour market definition. One prominent
study acknowledges the FCC’s use of the signal-contour method, but applies the Arbi-
14See James R.W. Bayes et al., “Third Circuit Court of Appeals Revisits Ear-
lier Decision on Media Ownership Rules,” MASS MEDIA UPDATE, October 2004, at
http://www.wileyrein.com/publications.cfm?spārticles&id4̄48.
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tron method, suggesting that the Arbitron method will tend to “overstate” the number of
stations in each market.15 The authors called their method of using Arbitron markets as
proxies for FCC-clusters the “policy band” approach, since all major markets fell into
one of four “policy bands”—those with local ownership limits of 8, 7, 6, or 5 stations,
depending on the number of stations in the Arbitron market.
Unfortunately, one cannot easily make a comparison between Arbitron markets and
FCC-clusters, because of the fundamental differences in the two methods of market def-
inition. While the Arbitron method places each station into one and only one market, the
signal-contour method places each station in potentially hundreds of merger-scrutinized
clusters. As this section will show, sometimes the “policy band” method is close to the
signal-contour method, and sometimes it is not. Whether the signal-contour market def-
inition results in more or less permissive regulation depends on the specific geometry of
stations’ signal-coverage areas and on the specific parameters chosen by the FCC (e.g.,
the 70-dBU contour).
2.4.2 Data and Methodology
To implement the signal-contour market definition, I used geographic information sys-
tems (GIS) data purchased from Radio-locator.com. There are approximately 10,000
commercial radio stations in the U.S. (See Figure 2.5.) The signal-coverage areas of
U.S. radio stations form a nearly seamless web across the entire U.S. (See Figure 2.6)
Calculating the pattern of intersections among 10,000 irregular polygons is not possible
computationally using ArcGIS spatial-analysis software (it bumps up against memory
15Berry & Waldfogel, supra, at 1016 & n.19.
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limits). As a result, it is necessary to break the country’s radio stations into groups.
It is convenient to start with a group of commercial stations that make up an Ar-
bitron market. This can lead to some confusion—applying the signal-contour method
to the group of stations that Arbitron defines as a “market”—but it is a necessary ap-
proach because most industry statistics like ratings and listenership are compiled using
Arbitron markets. First, I would calculate all the FCC-clusters of which those stations
are members. Then, by applying the rules of the signal-contour market definition, I can
determine how many stations that group one company can own under the signal-contour
market definition.
Consider the Arbitron market for Ann Arbor, Michigan, which contains 7 radio sta-
tions. (See Figure 2.7.) First, I determine the set of stations that intersect those stations.
The particular pattern of the intersections among those stations will determine how many
FCC-clusters involve the 7 Ann Arbor stations—in this case, 44 clusters. (See Table 2.2)
Next, for each cluster, I calculate how many other stations intersect at least one
station within the cluster. This determines the “size” of the cluster. Once each cluster
has been sized, I take the size of the cluster, compare it to the sliding scale of the local
ownership rule, and apply the appropriate limits. Since the rule has three parts—the
total limit, the FM limit, and the AM limit—each cluster gives rise to three distinct
constraints that restrict the number of stations each radio firm can own.
Figures 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10 display a particular cluster, number 26, which includes
2 Ann Arbor stations, WDEO-AM and WTKA-AM. Eight other stations make up the
cluster. But the size of the cluster is 196, because the 10 stations in Ann Arbor cluster
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26 intersect themselves as well as 186 other stations not in the cluster. Using the scale
of the local radio ownership rule (as of 1996), this means that one firm can own a total
of 8 out the 10 stations in the cluster, and up to 5 AM or 5 FM stations. Even though
cluster 26 is relatively small, it is treated as being a very large “radio market.” Here
one can observe the consequences of all the details of the FCC’s signal-contour market
definition.
Finally, once all the constraints for all the clusters have been calculated (in the case
of Ann Arbor, 132 constraints, or 3 times 44), I set up a constrained maximization
problem. I assume a hypothetical radio company that wishes to maximize the number
of stations it owns among a group of stations (in particular, a group of stations that make
up an Arbitron market, so that I can translate back to market statistics). The maximum
number of stations one firm can own, subject to all the constraints, is what I call the
“effective local ownership limit.”
2.4.3 Results
For the stations in the 100 largest Arbitron markets (as well as Ann Arbor, to continue
with the illustration), Table 2.3 reports the number of FCC-clusters that involve those
stations. For the biggest markets, the numbers become quite large as the density of radio
towers increases and the geometry of the signal-coverage areas becomes more complex.
The specific numbers for each Arbitron market are interesting in themselves, since
the complexity of the signal-contour geometry is not obvious. But, more importantly,
Table 2.3 conveys two key messages. First, the signal-contour market definition is much
22
more complex than simply drawing a boundary around a metropolitan area. Second, the
signal-contour market definition varies a great deal in complexity from city to city.
Table 2.4 reports the effective local ownership limits in 1995 (just before the Telecom-
munications Act) and 1996. It also provides the “policy band” limits for compari-
son. For instance, in Chicago, the policy band limit—which, again, was not the law—
increased from 4 to 8 stations from 1995 to 1996 because of the Telecommunications
Act. But, using the signal-contour method, the effective local ownership limit actually
increased from 32 to 49 stations.
Chicago is an extreme example of how the Arbitron and signal-contour market defi-
nitions diverge, since the Chicago metropolitan area has the largest number of licensed
commercial stations. But Table 2.4 shows that it is not unique in the following sense.
Among the stations making up almost every Arbitron market, the regulatory market
definition, based on signal contours, results in a higher local ownership limit than the
Arbitron market definition would have.
On average, across all 289 Arbitron markets for which I calculated the results of the
signal-contour market definition, the effective local ownership limit increased from 8.49
to 12.9 stations. (Figure 2.11 displays this increase graphically.) The policy band ap-
proach would put that increase at 3.57 to 5.65 stations, understating the local ownership
limits by almost 60 percent.
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2.4.4 Testing Possible Adjustments
Table 2.5 tests an assumption made in calculating the effective limits. I assumed a
hypothetical radio firm that wished to maximize the number stations it owned among the
stations in a given Arbitron market. But what if radio firms actually sought to maximize
the wattage of the stations they owned, or the population reached by the stations they
owned? Table 2.5 displays the results of adjusting the hypothetical radio firm’s objective
in this way, and compares it to the original, station-maximizing assumption.
The results are often similar but sometimes result in a much lower effective limit. But
I maintain the original assumption throughout the rest of the paper’s analysis because
the effective limits calculated with an assumption of station-maximization are more cor-
related with radio firms’ actual holdings: a correlation of 0.593, compared to 0.553 for
wattage-maximization and 0.489 for population-maximization. One explanation for this
might be that radio conglomerates, sought to maximize their station holdings.
Table 2.6, on the other hand, reflects a different kind of thought experiment. As
described in subsection 2.3.2, the FCC made two important choices when designing the
signal-contour market definition: (1) it chose the particular contour of 70 dBUs and (2)
it chose to define an FCC-cluster’s “size” as the total number of stations intersected by
the cluster (including itself), rather than simply the number of stations in the cluster.
Table 2.6 shows what the effective local ownership limits would have been had the FCC
chosen a different contour, a different “size”-counting method, or both.
The results show that the FCC chose a particular permissive version of the signal-
contour method. For example, using a 60-dBU contour and a simpler “size”-counting
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method would have given Atlanta an effective local ownership limit of 36 stations rather
than 46 stations (comparing the fourth column to the first).
But the point of Table 2.6 goes beyond the continuing story of how the FCC chose to
allow even more concentration of radio ownership through its market-definition method.
It also shows that the signal-contour method is not predictable, because it depends on the
complex geometry of a set of radio stations’ signal-coverage areas. This unpredictability
provides some of the rationale for using the local radio ownership limit, as implemented
with the signal-contour market definition, as a natural experiment.
2.5 Firms’ Response to Regulation
As the examples mentioned above suggest, radio firms took advantage—at least to some
extent—of the signal-contour market definition. By 2004, at least one radio firm’s hold-
ings exceeded those that would have applied (hypothetically) under an Arbitron market
definition in 104 different Arbitron markets. This Section discusses how radio firms
behaved in response to the change in the local radio ownership limit, as applied with the
signal-contour market definition, contained in the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
2.5.1 Comparing Radio Firms’ Station Holdings to the Regulatory Limit
Figure 2.12 displays the difference—for each of the 289 Arbitron markets studied—
between the effective local ownership limit and the number of stations owned by the
firm with the most stations. What the graph shows is that, in 1995, only a handful of
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radio firms met or exceed the local ownership limit.16 By 2000, after the 1996 increase
in the local ownership limit, even fewer radio firms met the limit (only two) and no firms
exceeded the limit.
This surprising result demonstrates that radio firms took some, but not full, advan-
tage of the signal-contour market definition and the FCC’s permissive implementation of
radio-ownership limits. Subsection 2.7.1 below discusses the implications of this result
in more detail.
2.5.2 A Natural Experiment
The signal-contour market definition had a different application in each metropolitan
area in the U.S., because it depended on the idiosyncratic geometry of each metropolitan
areas radio stations and how their signal coverage areas happened to overlap with each
other. Because part of the increase in concentration was caused by the oddities of a
regulation that were unrelated to market forces, this facilitates a rigorous causal test of
the effects of increased concentration of media ownership. Such a test is highly desirable
for policy purposes, given the difficulty of sorting out the effects of regulatory policies
from the effects of businesses and consumers actions, let alone random events.17
The first step in such a test—the first-stage regression, in econometric terms—is to
estimate a regression of increased ownership concentration on the effective local radio
ownership rule. Table 2.7 shows a cross-tabulation of that relationship, also controlling
16Some firms may have purchased stations in excess of the limit in anticipation of the Telecommunica-
tions Act, and either received a waiver from the FCC or were not detected in time for it to matter.
17See supra subsection 2.2.3 for a discussion of why a simple regression of market outcomes like
programming variety on ownership concentration is likely to be invalid.
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for the FCC’s granting of additional full-power, commercial licenses in certain Arbitron
markets. Table 2.7 suggests that the change in the effective local radio ownership limit
from 1995 to 1996 had a positive effect on ownership concentration, as measured by the
holdings of the largest radio firm with respect to each Arbitron market.
To measure the change in the effective ownership limit, I use the change from 1995 to
1996—the “overnight” effect of the Telecommunications Act interacting with the signal-
contour market definition—to leave out any effects of market forces. But I measure the
changes in other variables from Fall 1995 to Fall 2000, starting before the change in the
local ownership limits and giving the change time to play out in the form of mergers and
new business strategies.
Table 2.8 reports summary statistics. Table 2.9 displays the results of the first-stage
regression, first in levels and then in changes. I find a strong relationship between the
effective ownership limits and concentration. In the simplest specification, in the fourth
column of Table 2.9, I find that an increase of 1 station in the effective limit results
in the largest firm in the market owning approximately 0.3 more stations, with a 95%
confidence interval of approximately 0.22 to 0.38. The effect is statistically significant at
the 1% level. The regression also shows, unsurprisingly, that an increase in the number
of licensed stations is correlated with a greater number of stations owned by the largest
firm.
That the estimated response of firms to a more permissive regulation is not one-
for-one accords with the analysis of Figure 2.12. Firms took advantage of the loop-
hole, and tended to take more advantage where the loophole was bigger. But, perhaps
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for the reasons hypothesized in the previous subsection, radio firms did not exploit the
signal-contour market definition to its absolute fullest, at least not within 5 years of the
Telecommunications Act.
I report the specification in the fifth column, adding two other control variables,
because I hypothesized that an increase in noncommercial stations or an increase in per
capita income might affect some of the outcome variables discussed in the next section.
Neither variable is statistically significant, causing the first stage to lose some strength,
but the results of the next section were not much affected by the choice between the
simpler specification and the specification adding those two variables. The sixth column
adds demographic variables (in levels, since the changes over five years would be tiny),
but they had little explanatory power and I left them out of the analysis of the next
section.
2.6 Effects of Increased Concentration
This section represents the culmination of this paper’s descriptions of the idiosyncracies
of the signal-contour market definition, which I argue resulted in a natural experiment in
increased consolidation. I try to exploit the strong results of the first-stage regression to
estimate the effects of concentration on: format variety, amount of news programming,
advertising revenue, commercial versus noncommercial ratings, and listenership.
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2.6.1 Format Variety
The first column of Table 2.10 reports the two-stage least squares estimates for the effect
of increased concentration on the variety of programming formats available in each
market (using the effective local ownership limit that I calculated as an instrument). I
find support for Peter Steiner’s theory that increased concentration can lead to greater
programming variety, estimating an increase of 0.8 programming formats available in a
market for every 1-station increase in the holdings of the largest firm within the market.
This suggests that concentration provides a benefit for consumers, but the finding
comes with a caveat. An increase in the number of format names has occurred over
the time period in question. For example, to “Lite Adult Contemporary” and “Soft
Adult Contemporary,” the industry has added “Bright Adult Contemporary.” It seems
doubtful that “Bright” provides a truly different set of songs or other programming than
“Lite” or “Soft.” But it is possible that radio firms are providing new combinations
and nuances that radio listeners desire. If the firms with the greatest number of stations
were more likely to coin new format names, that would cast doubt on whether increased
concentration truly increases variety.
Ideally, one could find additional measures of programming variety. Programming
formats do not provide a fine-grained or ideal measure of programming variety. Unfor-
tunately, historical data on playlists or network programming are not available, to my
knowledge, dating back to 1995 (that is, before the Telecommunications Act). Without
that kind of historical reach, data are not useful to take advantage of the natural exper-




I also measured the amount of stations (or fractions of stations, reflecting stations that
split their broadcast day among different formats) offering news, information, or busi-
ness and financial news. As I report in the second column of Table 2.10, I found no
effect, positive or negative, of concentration on the amount of news programming of-
fered, at least over the period from 1995 to 2000. Concentration within local markets
does not appear to cause a decrease in news programming. In other words, the large ra-
dio station groups generally continued to offer news as one among a portfolio of formats
as of 2000.
This measure does not speak to the quality of news programming. Radio news is
notorious for “rip and read” news broadcasts that piggyback on newspaper headlines.18
And the situation may have changed in the last seven years, as National Public Radio
gains prominence and as radio news adopted an arguably diminished role in providing
news and public affairs information. But my estimates show that concentration did not,
in the short term, cause a decrease in the amount of news programming.
2.6.3 Advertising Revenue
With restrictions on entry and increasing concentration, one would predict that radio
firms could exert some market power and charge higher advertising prices, offer more
18In a separate chapter of my dissertation, I document the decreases in employment of news reporters
correlated with increased concentration.
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advertising time, or both—all leading to an increase in advertising revenue. Moreover,
Steiner’s theory suggests that larger station groups can garner more listeners with their
wider array of programming, and thus one would expect them to gain more advertising
revenue. The third column of Table 2.10 finds just such a result, suggesting that a one-
station increase in the largest firm’s station holdings results in an additional $34 million
in advertising revenue market-wide. The market-wide measure includes any effect on
firms with increased holdings that are not the largest within the market, to allow the local
ownership limit to be assessed at the level of Arbitron markets rather than individual
firms.
2.6.4 Commercial versus Noncommercial Ratings
Local commercial ratings share measures the percentage of radio listeners who are lis-
tening to radio stations based in that market, as opposed to (1) radio stations in neigh-
boring markets and (2) noncommercial stations. I estimate that a one-station increase in
the largest firm’s holdings causes a decrease of 1.2 ratings points in local commercial
share. To the extent that this does not reflect a trend toward listening to commercial
stations in neighboring markets, this might reflect a greater shift toward noncommercial
radio in Arbitron markets with more consolidated commercial sectors. But this result
is not particularly robust to alternative specifications of the time period; the Arbitron
ratings data seem stable from 1996 onward, but the pre-1996 data appear less reliable.
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2.6.5 Listenership
I measure listenership as the average percentage of the population listening to radio
at a given time. As the summary statistics in Table 2.8 show, radio listenership was in
decline, even from 1995 to 2000 (it has declined even more since, although 95 percent of
the population still listens to radio at some point during the week, according to Arbitron).
I estimate that concentration has zero effect on listenership, with a confidence interval
of 0.2 percentage points in either direction.
This results suggests that the increase in programming variety caused by the FCC
allowing larger station groups to exist has not helped radio retain listeners. Perhaps the
remaining radio listeners’ preferences are more fully satisfied, but, contrary to Steiner’s
theory, wider variety has not garnered more listeners. Taken together with the other
results, this suggests that the increase in advertising revenue caused by increased con-
centration is either the result of either more intensely satisfied listeners or increased
market power in the local market for radio advertising, but it does not appear to be the
result of radio having more listeners.
2.7 Legal Implications
The story of radio in the 1990s provides important knowledge about media regulation.
But the unique characteristics of this regulatory episode also allow for analysis that sheds
light on more general questions of law and economics, antitrust, and administrative law.
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2.7.1 Law and Economics
Law and economics has a general concern with how firms and individuals respond to
legal rules. It is surprising to find that the effective local ownership limit only appears to
bind in 2 out of the 289 major metropolitan areas. Radio firms took some, but not full,
advantage of the FCC’s permissive implementation of the local radio ownership rule.
One economic theory would have suggested that, in a market without free entry (that
is, where regulation protects incumbent firms), each station owned provides profits—
making ownership of the maximum number of stations possible very desirable. This
would be especially so if economies of scale existed.
What can explain such a result? Radio firms may have encountered non-regulatory
constraints, such as competition for stations among regional or national consolidators
or credit constraints after radio firms engaged in an unprecedented series of mergers.
Another possibility is that radio firms were able to exploit economies of scale up to a
point, but experienced diminishing returns or even experienced diseconomies of scale.
A final conjecture is that radio firms might have wanted to avoid public or regulatory
awareness of the signal-contour market definition’s highly permissive effects. By taking
some advantage of what amount to a loophole in the limits specified by the Telecommu-
nications Act, but not taking too much advantage, the radio firms may have delayed the
eventual outcome: the FCC closing the loophole, as it did in 2004.
Further research into the administrative process that created this whole episode in
radio policy may lend support to one or more of these hypotheses. At this point, how-
ever, it is important to note the general point that, while firms do respond to regulations,
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the magnitude or elasticity of their response remains an empirical question for law-
and-economics. The holdings of the largest radio firm increased by only 0.3 stations
in response to a one-station increase in the effective ownership limit; this presents a
new set of questions about how radio regulation and market forces interact in the radio
industry, and more generally about how firms respond to regulation.
2.7.2 Quasi-Antitrust Law for Media
In appellate cases challenging its media-ownership decisions, the FCC has consistently
failed to justify its specific decisions.19 Why is the local radio ownership limit for sta-
tions with 45 stations or more eight stations—why not seven or nine? The estimates
of this paper could be used to calibrate a better-justified local radio ownership rule.
Suppose that the FCC could come up with rough weights on the importance of lower
advertising prices, the number of listeners, the number of programming formats offered
in each market, and so on. Table 2.10 provides estimates of how changes in the station
holdings of radio firms will affect those variables. From there, given rough weights on
its various objectives, the FCC could at least begin to provide the courts for a rationale.
2.7.3 Administrative Process
Radios experience with the FCCs method of market definition, interacting with Con-
gresss actions to relax the restrictions on local radio ownership in the Telecom Act, pro-
vide a case study to examine where the administrative process worked well and where
19See, e.g., Prometheus Radio Project v FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2005); Fox Television Stations v.
FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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it failed. The signal-contour market definition provides a case study to test four leading
theories of the administrative process.20
On the score of transparency, the FCCs signal-contour market definition fails badly.
It prevented most policy makers, let alone the general public, from understanding the
limits in place on radio ownership. On the other hand, the FCC eventually took ac-
tion to change its method of market definition, which had benefited industry but had
still escaped the notice of the general public, given its arcane nature. In 2004, the FCC
switched to a much less permissive, and much easier to understand, method of specify-
ing how many stations one company can own within a metropolitan area. (Admittedly,
it did so while grandfathering the effects of the signal-contour market definition.) This
presents a puzzle about the administrative process. If media firms have captured the
FCC, then why did the FCC reverse course on the market-definition issue? If the rule-
making process was so broken, how did it repair itself? Future work will explore these
question in more detail.
2.8 Conclusion
After the Telecommunications Act of 1996, neither the public nor policymakers had the
basic facts about radio regulation. This paper attempts to provide those facts, and un-
covers some surprising results about FCC radio policy and how radio firms responded
to regulation. The FCC crafted a highly permissive market definition, allowing an even
greater increase in concentration than Congress allowed in the Telecommunications Act
20See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1998).
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of 1996. Radio firms took some advantage of this loophole, but stopped short of taking
full advantage. Using the episode as a natural experiment in increased concentration, I
find strong evidence that increased concentration leads to increased programming vari-
ety and advertising revenue. But concentration does not appear to increase listenership,
perhaps a more important measure of consumer welfare.
The story of the FCC’s signal-contour market definition rebuts some parts of the
critique of media concentration, particularly the hypothesis of increasingly homogenous
programming within markets. Meanwhile, some aspects of Steiner’s theory (though
not increased listenership) found confirmation. But the paper’s most surprising finding
might be that radio regulation did not bind radio firms. That finding cuts both ways
for the competing theories of media regulation. For the critics of media regulation, it
rebuts their contention that the local radio ownership rule shackled radio companies and
prevented them from exploiting economies of scale. But for the proponents of media
regulation, the results suggest that—at least during the period studied from 1995 to
2000—enough competition may have existed among radio firms to prevent them from
taking full advantage of the market-definition loophole and monopolizing local markets.
Having the facts about the local radio ownership rule suggests that many tacit as-
sumptions in the debate over radio consolidation (including some of my own prior con-
tributions) have been mistaken. The market-definition loophole has now been closed,
although grandfathered. But the story of radio regulation since the 1990s is of more
than historical interest, and not just because radio remains viable, so far, in the face
of new technologies. The administrative process at the FCC displayed weaknesses in
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spawning an opaque and surprisingly permissive regulation made more permissive with
every parameter chosen. But it has also displayed some strength, perhaps, by involv-
ing the public more in recent years and in closing the market-definition loophole. In
future work, I plan to use radio regulation as a case study in the administrative process.
Ideally, that work will have general implications about administrative law and will also
contribute toward further improvements at the FCC, which has many more issues to face
in the coming years.
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Appendix 2.A: The Steiner Model of Radio Firms’ Programming Choices Under
Monopoly and Competition
Assume fixed preferences Li for each programming format Pi. Assume further that the
cost of offering any programming format is fixed at c.21 The programming formats are
ranked according to their associated listener base:
L1, L2, L3, . . . Lj, Lk . . .
where Lj is the least popular format that is offered while Lk is the most popular format




In words, consumers are better off when more programming formats are offered, since
more of them have their programming preferences satisfied.
The FCC sets the number of stations n that are available in the market, where n is less
than the number of possible programming formats I . Let xi be the number of stations
already choosing to offer format Pi when a radio firm chooses its format. Assume that
stations offering the same programming format split the listeners equally. The game




Under competition, in which each station is owned and controlled by a different firm,
duplication occurs in equilibrium whenever Li
2
> Lk for some i ≤ j. Under monopoly,
21This means that the potential cost savings of offering homogenous programming across stations are
essentially assumed away in Steiner’s model to make a point about the demand side of the market.
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on the other hand, duplication never occurs. Therefore, monopoly is weakly preferred
to competition for all possible values of the Li and n and is strongly preferred for many
possible values of the Li and n.
39
Appendix 2.B: Formal Specification of Signal-Contour Market Definition
Local radio markets as defined by the FCC—“merger-scrutinized clusters”—are based
on the signal coverage areas of radio stations. These coverage areas must be defined for
a particular “signal contour,” i.e. one can only define a coverage area for a particular
signal strength. So the FCC’s method of market definition is often known as the signal-
contour approach. It proceeds in six steps:
1. We start by defining the set of radio stations with coverage areas {S1 . . .Sn} to
which the signal-contour market definition will apply. The FCC chose to apply
their market definition across the entire U.S., without recognizing sub-boundaries
such as states or metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).22
2. We determine the full set of intersections over all stations’ coverage areas such
that
S1 ∩ S2 ∩ · · · ∩ Si 6= ∅ and S1 ∩ S2 ∩ · · · ∩ Si ∩ Sj = ∅ ∀Sj
In a sense, we want the maximal intersections of coverage areas. For each inter-
section in this set, we call the stations making up the intersection the “merger-
scrutinized cluster.” Note that each station Si can be part of multiple maximal
intersections and thus part of multiple cluster.
3. We determine, for each merger-scrutinized cluster, the set of all stations that in-
tersect one of the stations that define the cluster. We can this the “sizing set.”
22This step may seem obvious, but we will want to vary this step to actually calculate the effect of the
FCC market definition.
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4. The cardinality of the sizing set determines the “size” of each market for purposes
of applying the sliding scale of the local radio ownership limit.
5. We apply the local ownership cap to each defining set, based on the cardinality of
its sizing set and the applicable local ownership limit.
6. The cap is applied only to the stations in the merger-scrutinized cluster (hence the
name). It is not applied to the sizing set.
This method of market definition presents problems because in some ways, overlap-
ping with more stations makes the limits stricter, but in other ways, overlapping with














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.1: The Local Radio Ownership Rule as of 1996
In a market with . . . One firm can own . . . And . . .
45 or more stations 8 stations total 5 AM or FM
30 to 44 stations 7 stations total 4 AM or FM
15 to 29 stations 6 stations total 4 AM or FM
10 to 14 stations 5 stations total 3 AM or FM
8 or 9 stations 4 stations total 3 AM or FM
6 or 7 stations 3 stations total 3 AM or FM
4 or 5 stations 2 stations total 2 AM or FM
2 to 3 stations 2 stations total 1 AM or FM



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.3: Number of FCC-Clusters by Arbitron Market
Rank Abritron Market Name






1 New York 41 206
2 Los Angeles 72 275
3 Chicago, IL 86 222
4 San Francisco 48 368
5 Dallas - Ft. Worth 57 125
6 Philadelphia 43 142
7 Washington, DC 47 135
8 Boston 62 196
9 Houston-Galveston 56 118
10 Detroit 39 179
11 Atlanta, GA 65 126
12 Miami-Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood 43 155
13 Puerto Rico 78 113
14 Seattle-Tacoma 54 66
15 Phoenix, AZ 43 33
16 Minneapolis - St. Paul 45 71
17 San Diego 29 82
18 Nassau-Suffolk 23 83
19 St. Louis 50 98
20 Baltimore, MD 31 129
21 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater 42 120
22 Denver - Boulder 38 94
23 Pittsburgh, PA 50 109
24 Portland, OR 40 42
25 Cleveland 29 124
26 Cincinnati 32 141
27 Sacramento, CA 35 230
28 Riverside-San Bernardino 25 106
29 Kansas City 33 119
30 San Jose 14 172
31 San Antonio, TX 39 102
32 Milwaukee - Racine 33 194
33 Middlesex-Somerset-Union, NJ 5 39
34 Salt Lake City - Ogden 43 19
35 Providence-Warwick-Pawtucket, RI 29 106
36 Columbus, OH 31 74
37 Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill 41 104
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Table 2.3 (continued)
Rank Abritron Market Name






38 Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News 33 38
39 Orlando 33 138
40 Indianapolis, IN 29 75
41 Las Vegas, NV 29 18
42 Greensboro-Winston Salem-High Point 38 131
43 Austin, TX 29 78
44 Nashville 46 103
45 New Orleans 32 114
46 Raleigh - Durham, NC 39 129
47 W. Palm Beach-Boca Raton 26 257
48 Memphis 39 94
49 Hartford-New Britain-Middletown 27 64
50 Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 25 35
51 Monmouth-Ocean, NJ 11 37
52 Jacksonville, FL 34 117
53 Rochester, NY 31 38
54 Oklahoma City 28 52
55 Louisville, KY 35 104
56 Richmond, VA 26 23
57 Birmingham, AL 36 85
58 Dayton, Ohio 28 65
59 Westchester, NY 8 66
60 Greenville-Spartanburg, SC 37 141
61 Albany-Schenectady-Troy 43 68
62 Honolulu 28 2
63 McAllen-Brownsville-Harlingen, TX 22 17
64 Tucson, AZ 27 22
65 Tulsa, OK 31 83
66 Grand Rapids, MI 28 58
67 Wilkes Barre - Scranton 37 63
68 Fresno 37 76
69 Allentown - Bethlehem 17 48
70 Ft. Myers-Naples-Marco Island 31 291
71 Knoxville, TN 36 85
72 Albuquerque, NM 36 22
73 Akron, OH 9 90
74 Omaha - Council Bluffs 22 63
75 Wilmington, DE 13 58
76 Monterey-Salinas-Santa Cruz 30 127
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Table 2.3 (continued)
Rank Abritron Market Name






77 El Paso, TX 20 10
78 Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 24 66
79 Syracuse, NY 27 44
80 Sarasota - Bradenton, FL 10 66
81 Toledo, OH 26 53
82 Springfield, MA 18 30
83 Baton Rouge, LA 21 65
84 Greenville-New Bern-Jacksonville 39 75
85 Little Rock, AR 36 66
86 Gainesville - Ocala, FL 25 50
87 Stockton, CA 9 91
88 Columbia, SC 23 40
89 Des Moines, IA 24 101
90 Bakersfield, CA 30 34
91 Mobile, AL 25 41
92 Wichita, KS 23 46
93 Charleston, SC 26 41
94 Spokane, WA 26 20
95 Daytona Beach, FL 11 47
96 Colorado Springs, CO 22 28
97 Madison, WI 27 68
98 Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol 31 102
99 Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 11 31
100 Melbourne-Titusville-Cocoa, FL 13 74









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.5: Alternative Objectives of Radio Firms









1 New York 11 9 8
2 Los Angeles 29 20 12
3 Chicago, IL 49 26 26
4 San Francisco 20 12 14
5 Dallas - Ft. Worth 28 21 19
6 Philadelphia 18 15 13
7 Washington, DC 23 19 20
8 Boston 37 29 31
9 Houston-Galveston 24 21 16
10 Detroit 17 11 12
11 Atlanta, GA 46 40 39
12 Miami-Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood 11 10 10
13 Puerto Rico 38 29 N/A
14 Seattle-Tacoma 25 15 16
15 Phoenix, AZ 17 15 17
16 Minneapolis - St. Paul 28 20 19
17 San Diego 12 12 11
18 Nassau-Suffolk 19 19 19
19 St. Louis 23 19 18
20 Baltimore, MD 13 12 13
21 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater 16 14 15
22 Denver - Boulder 10 10 9
23 Pittsburgh, PA 30 26 24
24 Portland, OR 17 13 13
25 Cleveland 14 12 13
26 Cincinnati 16 15 15
27 Sacramento, CA 20 19 17
28 Riverside-San Bernardino 19 19 18
29 Kansas City 13 13 11
30 San Jose 8 8 8
31 San Antonio, TX 15 14 10
32 Milwaukee - Racine 17 12 14
33 Middlesex-Somerset-Union, NJ 5 5 5
34 Salt Lake City - Ogden 14 12 11
35 Providence-Warwick-Pawtucket, RI 21 18 18
36 Columbus, OH 24 17 22
37 Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill 29 22 24
38 Norfolk-Va. Beach-Newport News 14 13 13
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Table 2.5 (continued)









39 Orlando 13 11 9
40 Indianapolis, IN 15 13 13
41 Las Vegas, NV 10 10 10
42 Greensboro-Winston Salem-High Pt. 23 21 19
43 Austin, TX 15 11 11
44 Nashville 28 16 22
45 New Orleans 13 13 10
46 Raleigh - Durham, NC 27 24 23
47 W. Palm Beach-Boca Raton 14 9 12
48 Memphis 18 16 15
49 Hartford-New Britain-Middletown 18 16 14
50 Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 11 10 10
51 Monmouth-Ocean, NJ 11 11 11
52 Jacksonville, FL 16 10 12
53 Rochester, NY 20 18 20
54 Oklahoma City 12 11 10
55 Louisville, KY 19 15 16
56 Richmond, VA 14 10 13
57 Birmingham, AL 21 14 17
58 Dayton, Ohio 18 15 15
59 Westchester, NY 8 8 8
60 Greenville-Spartanburg, SC 26 21 21
61 Albany-Schenectady-Troy 30 27 28
62 Honolulu 6 6 6
63 McAllen-Brownsville-Harlingen, TX 12 8 10
64 Tucson, AZ 11 9 11
65 Tulsa, OK 16 15 13
66 Grand Rapids, MI 13 13 13
67 Wilkes Barre - Scranton 27 25 24
68 Fresno 20 15 19
69 Allentown - Bethlehem 13 12 13
70 Ft. Myers-Naples-Marco Island 17 16 17
71 Knoxville, TN 22 16 17
72 Albuquerque, NM 13 12 13
73 Akron, OH 8 8 8
74 Omaha - Council Bluffs 8 8 8
75 Wilmington, DE 13 13 13
76 Monterey-Salinas-Santa Cruz 14 13 14
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Table 2.5 (continued)









77 El Paso, TX 7 7 7
78 Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 18 16 16
79 Syracuse, NY 18 16 17
80 Sarasota - Bradenton, FL 9 9 9
81 Toledo, OH 19 17 19
82 Springfield, MA 15 14 14
83 Baton Rouge, LA 10 10 9
84 Greenville-New Bern-Jacksonville 33 32 28
85 Little Rock, AR 20 16 19
86 Gainesville - Ocala, FL 22 17 21
87 Stockton, CA 9 9 9
88 Columbia, SC 12 12 12
89 Des Moines, IA 13 11 10
90 Bakersfield, CA 13 12 13
91 Mobile, AL 14 13 12
92 Wichita, KS 11 12 11
93 Charleston, SC 14 14 15
94 Spokane, WA 9 8 8
95 Daytona Beach, FL 10 10 10
96 Colorado Springs, CO 8 8 8
97 Madison, WI 20 18 19
98 Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol 23 18 17
99 Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 11 11 11
100 Melbourne-Titusville-Cocoa, FL 10 10 11
145 Ann Arbor, MI 7 7 7
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Table 2.6: Alternative Parameters for the FCC’s Market Definition











1 New York 11 10 10 9
2 Los Angeles 29 21 27 22
3 Chicago, IL 49 39 45 35
4 San Francisco 20 16 19 15
5 Dallas - Ft. Worth 28 22 25 20
6 Philadelphia 18 17 17 19
7 Washington, DC 23 19 22 19
8 Boston 37 34 32 31
9 Houston-Galveston 24 20 22 19
10 Detroit 17 16 16 16
11 Atlanta, GA 46 38 40 36
12 Miami-Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood 11 10 11 10
13 Puerto Rico 38 27 33 25
14 Seattle-Tacoma 25 21 22 18
15 Phoenix, AZ 17 15 15 15
16 Minneapolis - St. Paul 28 22 23 20
17 San Diego 12 10 11 8
18 Nassau-Suffolk 19 19 14 15
19 St. Louis 23 21 20 19
20 Baltimore, MD 13 10 12 10
21 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater 16 14 15 14
22 Denver - Boulder 10 10 9 9
23 Pittsburgh, PA 30 26 26 23
24 Portland, OR 17 14 15 13
25 Cleveland 14 12 12 10
26 Cincinnati 16 14 14 13
27 Sacramento, CA 20 16 19 15
28 Riverside-San Bernardino 19 15 16 14
29 Kansas City 13 12 11 12
30 San Jose 8 8 7 7
31 San Antonio, TX 15 14 14 12
32 Milwaukee - Racine 17 13 15 12
33 Middlesex-Somerset-Union, NJ 5 5 5 5
34 Salt Lake City - Ogden 14 11 12 10
35 Providence-Warwick-Pawtucket, RI 21 18 16 15
36 Columbus, OH 24 17 22 14
37 Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill 29 23 23 19
38 Norfolk-VA Beach-Newport News 14 11 11 10
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Table 2.6 (continued)        











39 Orlando 13 13 14 15
40 Indianapolis, IN 15 13 13 12
41 Las Vegas, NV 10 8 8 7
42 Greensboro-Winston Salem-H. Pt. 23 18 19 16
43 Austin, TX 15 11 13 12
44 Nashville 28 24 26 22
45 New Orleans 13 8 11 7
46 Raleigh - Durham, NC 27 19 22 17
47 W. Palm Beach-Boca Raton 14 9 11 8
48 Memphis 18 18 16 16
49 Hartford-New Britain-Middletown 18 15 17 13
50 Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 11 9 9 8
51 Monmouth-Ocean, NJ 11 11 7 8
52 Jacksonville, FL 16 11 14 11
53 Rochester, NY 20 18 16 16
54 Oklahoma City 12 11 10 9
55 Louisville, KY 19 16 17 14
56 Richmond, VA 14 11 12 9
57 Birmingham, AL 21 17 18 16
58 Dayton, Ohio 18 12 15 10
59 Westchester, NY 8 8 7 7
60 Greenville-Spartanburg, SC 26 23 22 19
61 Albany-Schenectady-Troy 30 23 23 18
62 Honolulu 6 7 6 6
63 McAllen-Brownsville-Harlingen, TX 12 10 11 8
64 Tucson, AZ 11 10 9 7
65 Tulsa, OK 16 14 14 12
66 Grand Rapids, MI 13 11 11 9
67 Wilkes Barre - Scranton 27 22 19 18
68 Fresno 20 12 17 11
69 Allentown - Bethlehem 13 13 10 10
70 Ft. Myers-Naples-Marco Island 17 14 15 12
71 Knoxville, TN 22 16 20 14
72 Albuquerque, NM 13 10 10 9
73 Akron, OH 8 8 6 6
74 Omaha - Council Bluffs 8 8 6 6
75 Wilmington, DE 13 11 8 8
76 Monterey-Salinas-Santa Cruz 14 13 11 12
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Table 2.6 (continued)        











77 El Paso, TX 7 7 7 7
78 Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 18 15 15 13
79 Syracuse, NY 18 16 14 15
80 Sarasota - Bradenton, FL 9 8 7 7
81 Toledo, OH 19 17 16 14
82 Springfield, MA 15 13 12 11
83 Baton Rouge, LA 10 9 8 7
84 Greenville-New Bern-Jacksonville 33 29 26 23
85 Little Rock, AR 20 16 18 15
86 Gainesville - Ocala, FL 22 16 15 14
87 Stockton, CA 9 8 7 6
88 Columbia, SC 12 10 10 8
89 Des Moines, IA 13 11 11 9
90 Bakersfield, CA 13 11 10 9
91 Mobile, AL 14 12 12 10
92 Wichita, KS 11 9 9 7
93 Charleston, SC 14 11 12 9
94 Spokane, WA 9 8 8 6
95 Daytona Beach, FL 10 10 8 8
96 Colorado Springs, CO 8 8 6 8
97 Madison, WI 20 17 17 15
98 Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol 23 19 18 17
99 Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 11 8 10 7
100 Melbourne-Titusville-Cocoa, FL 10 9 8 7




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Calculated Local Radio Ownership Limit, 1995 8.49 4.69 (2, 34)
Calculated Local Radio Ownership Limit, 1996 12.9 6.65 (2, 49)
Change in Limit, Before & After Telecom Act 4.45 2.40 (0, 17)
Licensed Commercial Stations, 1995 20.9 13.0 (2, 87)
Licensed Commercial Stations, 2000 22.1 13.4 (2, 92)
Change in Commercial Stations, 1995-2000 1.16 1.33 (0, 12)
Stations Owned by Market's Largest Firm, Fall 1995 3.00 0.966 (1, 6)
Stations Owned by Market's Largest Firm, Fall 2000 5.58 1.98 (1, 13)
Change in Largest Firm's Holdings, 1995-2000 2.58 1.72 (-2, 10)
Format Variety, Fall 1995 13.9 5.60 (4, 32)
Format Variety, Fall 2000 16.1 6.46 (4, 37)
Change in Format Variety, 1995-2000 2.19 2.69 (-6, 16)
News-Format Station-Equivalents, Fall 1995 1.30 1.06 (0, 5.2)
News-Format Station-Equivalents, Fall 2000 1.39 1.19 (0, 8.7)
Change in News-Format Station-Equivs., 1995-2000 0.0966 0.945 (-2.7, 6.1)
Advertising Revenue, 1995 ($ million) 28.3 57.6 (0.05, 513)
Advertising Revenue, 2000 ($ million) 47.3 106 (0.25, 927)
Change in Advertising Revenue, 1995-2000 ($ m) 19.0 49.0 (-1.46, 413)
Local Commercial Stations' Ratings Share, 1995 71.2 20.9 (9, 92.4)
Local Commercial Stations' Ratings Share, 2000 71.0 20.5 (11.2, 92.2)
Change in Local Comm. Stations' Share, 1995-2000 -0.257 4.04 (-12.6, 13.1)
Mean Percentage of People Listening to Radio, 1995 16.4 1.01 (13.4, 18.9)
Mean Percentage of People Listening to Radio, 2000 15.1 0.931 (12.3, 18.2)
Change in Listenership, 1995-2000 -1.32 0.735 (-3.7, 1.2)
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No. of Obs. 289 285 285 289 285 285
R-Squared 0.508 0.521 0.558 0.229 0.223 0.279
F-Statistic 147 76.2 19.8 42.4 20.1 6.09

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sequential Musical Creation and Sample Licensing
3.1 Musical Appropriation, Borrowing, and Reference
Sampling is the musical practice of using fragments of existing sound recordings by
other musicians (called “samples”) as part of a new piece of music.1 Digital technol-
ogy has made sampling much less costly and has contributed to sampling’s proliferation
as a musical practice, playing a significant role in genres like hip-hop, electronic, and
art music. Sample-based music has enjoyed enormous commercial and critical success.
But copyright law presents obstacles to sampling and other forms of sequential creation.
Copyright law recognizes two types of copyrights in music, protecting both (1) musical
compositions and (2) sound recordings, which are often recordings of particular ren-
ditions of copyrighted compositions. Both kinds of copyrights can be implicated by a
single sample, meaning that sampling often requires two separate licenses. Obtaining
such licenses can be costly–or even impossible, when copyright holders refuse to deal.
In this chapter, I develop an economic model of sequential musical creation to inves-
1See MARK KATZ, CAPTURING SOUND: HOW TECHNOLOGY HAS CHANGED MUSIC138-41
(2004).
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tigate the optimal design of copyright law for handling the creation of sample-based
works.
Many musical practices involve borrowing, appropriating, or taking from preexist-
ing musical works; sampling is not unique in this regard. The long-common practice of
quotation involves taking a short phrase from a prior composition and working it into a
new composition. Quotation differs from sampling because it does not copy part of an
existing sound recording to make its reference, but it too involves borrowing from prior
material. “Covers” are re-recordings of musical compositions that other musicians have
recorded previously. Cover artists can tailor the composition to their own styles and
make their own arrangements, but only up to a point. Less literal forms of borrowing
occur all the time when musicians allude to previous music, adopt another musician’s
style, or work in a genre developed by countless previous musicians. Most importantly,
almost all music uses basic building blocks like notes, scales, chords, compositional
forms, and instruments. Only the rarest of musical works fails to use techniques of
appropriation, borrowing, or reference.2 Thus, all musical innovation involves combi-
nation and recombination of many elements, along with the addition of new elements, to
produce a unique creation. But copyright law contains stark differences in how it treats
the various modes of musical borrowing. As Section 3.2 describes, the recent Bridge-
port case has staked out a new extreme in the disfavored treatment of sampling under
U.S. copyright law.
Economically, musicians’ production functions use existing musical works as in-
2See, e.g., JOANNA DEMERS, STEAL THIS MUSIC: HOW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AF-
FECTS MUSICAL CREATIVITY 31-70 (2006).
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puts of production.3 Section 3.3 explores the implications of assuming that samplers
negotiate with licensors for the use of existing works, based on the sample-licensing
negotiations that occur in the music industry. The parties’ inability to write contracts
before production that allow both licensors and licensees to cover their costs results in
what the patent literature calls the division-of-profit inefficiency. Circumstances exist
in which either samplers’ or samplees’ incentive constraints result in their music not
being created. This illustrates how copyright’s regime for sampling can backfire when
it attempts to maximize copyright holders’ incentives rather than providing a balance
between copyright holders and subsequent users.4 When the sample-based work is not
created, the copyright holder in the existing work receives no licensing revenue, harming
the creators of existing works that the stronger copyright regime was supposed to help.
The final subsection of Section 3.3 extends the model to the multiple-licensor setting, to
capture the situation in which sample-based songs are collages of many complementary
samples.
Copyright law’s regime governing musicians’ use of existing music plays a large
role in what existing music can enter the production process, when licenses become
necessary, and how much licenses (and the licensing process) cost. The particular insti-
tutions and relationships involved in licensing negotiations will also play a significant
role. By specifying a formal model of how law, institutions, and incentives interact in
3For a model focused on complete duplication that also recognizes that creative works are inputs
to subsequent creative works, see WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 71-84 (2003).
4Cf. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 77–86 (2001) (describing the shift in copyright’s over-
arching rationale from a bargain between creators and the public to an attempt to maximize creators’
incentives).
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the context of sample licensing, this paper aims to provide systematic understanding of
the economic forces at work. Ideally, such modeling could someday result in a model
with both testable predictions and measurable variables—a tall order in the copyright
context. In the meantime, studying the incentives involved in sample licensing might
allow for a better design for copyright’s handling of sequential musical creation.
3.2 Copyright’s Regime for Sequential Musical Creation
This section provides some background in music copyright. It also explains the statu-
tory provisions and judicial opinions that govern musical appropriation, borrowing, and
reference in general, and sampling in particular.
3.2.1 Copyright Basics
As mentioned above, two kinds of copyrights potentially apply to any song or other
piece of music: a sound recording copyright5 and a musical composition copyright.6 In
popular songs, and most classical and jazz pieces, the sound recording is a particular
recorded rendition of an underlying musical composition, which includes the melody,
chords, rhythm, structure, and lyrics. The two copyright holders in a song may be
identical but often they are distinct. For example, Bob Dylan often records his own
compositions, but the Byrds also recorded versions of many of his compositions.
5Sound recordings are defined as “a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds [except for movie
soundtracks] . . . regardless of the nature of the material objects . . . in which they are embodied.” 17
U.S.C. §101 (2000). They were not protected under federal law until 1971. Sound Recordings Act, Pub.
L. No. 140, 85 Stat. 39 (1971).
6The copyright code uses the term “musical work,” but does not define it except to say that lyrics are
included. 17 U.S.C. §102(a)(2) (2000).
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Recording artists often transfer their sound recording copyrights to record labels in
return for financing and marketing their works, as well as advance and royalty payments.
Composers and songwriters generally sign contracts with publishers to administer their
copyrights, splitting the revenue. In addition, many composers belong to one of the per-
forming rights organizations, ASCAP, BMI, or SESAC. These organizations administer
blanket licenses for radio stations, concert venues, and others to perform their members’
songs publicly.7 In the models below, I will treat the sound recording copyright holders
and the musical composition copyright holders in existing works as single entities. In re-
ality such agents are more complex, but I assume that their profit-maximizing incentives
are aligned sufficiently for the analysis to be meaningful.
Musical compositions come with five exclusive rights: reproduction, distribution,
preparation of derivative works (such as adaptations and translations), performance, and
display. Sound recordings come with the same first three rights, a performance right
limited to certain online performances (i.e., leaving out performances on traditional AM
and FM radio), and no display right.8
Using a sample often involves infringing exclusive rights in both a copyrighted com-
position and a copyrighted sound recording. This is because taking a fragment of a
sound recording necessarily means using the part of the composition underlying that
fragment. For instance, using a sample of Marvin Gaye and Tammi Terrell singing
“Ain’t no mountain high enough / Ain’t no valley low enough” means not only using a
7For a primer on the music industry, see generally DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW
ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS (2000).
817 U.S.C. §106 (2000).
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recording of Gaye’s and Terrell’s voices singing those lines, but also using the melody,
harmony, and rhythm that make up the lines in the composition. A single action can
infringe multiple rights at once; sampling often does so. Using a sample can constitute
a reproduction. It can also constitute a derivative work, because taking a fragment of an
existing work and placing it into a sound collage is a form of adaptation. Additionally,
sampling can also implicate the copyright holders’ distribution and performance rights
if the sample-based song is marketed to the public, played live, or played on radio or
television).
The foregoing discussion uses conditional language (“can infringe”; “might infringe”)
to address whether a sample actually infringes a composition, sound recording, or both.
The conditional verb tense is necessary for three sets of reasons. First, not all compo-
sitions and recordings are subject to copyright protection. For example, some sound
recordings pre-date federal or state copyright protection. Other copyrights may have
existed at one time, but later expired because of copyright’s limited duration or because
the copyright was not renewed at a time the law still required renewal.9 Moreover, copy-
right owners can voluntarily put works into the public domain, meaning that the public
can use them freely.
Second, a sample might not infringe because even currently valid copyrights are
subject to limitations and exceptions. For instance, courts have recognized a “de min-
imis” threshold, meaning that using very small portion of a copyrighted work will not
9Copyright is also limited in time, expiring 70 years after an author’s death. 17 U.S.C. §302(a) (2000).
Copyrights lasts for 95 years after publication (or 120 years after creation, whichever comes first) for a
“work for hire,” meaning a work either commissioned or performed by an employee within the scope of
employment. Id. §§101, 302.
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necessarily constitute infringement.10 Another important limitation on copyright protec-
tion is the fair use doctrine, which gives infringement defendants an affirmative defense
for activities “such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship, or
research.”11 Many other limitations to copyright, both broad and narrow, exist in the
copyright code and in case law, but these are the most important provisions for the
model in this chapter.
The third and final reason a sample may not infringe a copyright would be a failure
on a copyright-infringement plaintiff’s part to demonstrate that the sample-based song
is “substantially similar” to the plaintiff’s recording or composition. Some infringement
cases involve identical copies of an entire work. But many other infringement cases
involve things that come close but are not identical—the idea being that altering a mi-
nuscule detail of a copyrighted work should not exonerate a brazen copier. Courts do
not require a complete, perfect copy for infringement. Instead, courts adjudicate claims
for infringement of the reproduction and derivative-works rights based on the substantial
similarity test.12 Because sampling is a unique form of musical borrowing, one treatise
writer has developed a modified concept of substantial similarity called “fragmented lit-
eral similarity” to handle sampling cases in which “the similarity [between two parties’
works], although literal, is not comprehensive—that is, the fundamental substance, or
skeleton or overall scheme . . . has not been copied; no more than a line, or a paragraph,
or a page or chapter of the copyrighted work has been appropriated.”13 The treatise
10See Judge Newman’s discussion in Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, 126 F.3d 70. 74-76
(2d Cir. 1997) (declining to find the defendant’s use de minimis).
1117 U.S.C. §107 (2000).
12See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 353-94 (2002).
13NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.03[A][2] (2005).
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provides “no easy rule of thumb” but advises courts to consider the sample both quanti-
tatively and qualitatively with respect to the “plaintiff’s” work.14 The cases in the next
subsection will illustrate how that doctrine applies in the sampling context.
The dual nature of music copyright—splitting the rights in music into composition
copyrights and sound recording copyrights—means that the number of necessary li-
censes is generally at least double the number of sampled songs. The limited nature of
copyright means that samplers will often, but not always, require a license to use ex-
isting works. In particular, samplers are free to use works that were never copyrighted
and works whose copyrights have expired. Samplers may also engage in non-infringing
uses of copyrighted works without permission or a license, but such uses may be dif-
ficult, uncertain, and costly to identify. In the models of this chapter, non-infringing
uses or works not under copyright have a licensing fee of zero, but they may come with
information costs to verify their status as non-infringing.
3.2.2 Sampling Case Law
Digital technology and the rise of hip-hop led to an increase in sampling activity among
musicians in the 1970s and 1980s. By the 1980s, copyright owners began to file lawsuits,
many of which settled out of court. In 1991, Grand Upright Music v. Warner Brothers
Records was the first published judicial opinion to establish that sampling was copyright
infringement.15 Rapper Biz Markie admitted to sampling the song “Alone Again (Nat-
urally)” by Gilbert O’Sullivan. Judge Kevin Duffy’s opinion famously opened with the
14Id. (emphasis in original).
15780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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phrase “Thou shalt not steal,” and found that Biz Markie’s sample infringed O’Sullivan’s
composition copyright.16 Although the opinion lacked a thorough analysis of copyright
law, the case signaled to the music industry that samples should be cleared to avoid an
infringement lawsuit.
More lawsuits ensued.17 Each sampling case is decided based on the specific facts
and context.
Three particularly prominent sampling cases—one about fair use, two about the de
minimis threshold—illustrate the difficulties of discerning the boundary between in-
fringing and non-infringing samples.
The Supreme Court addressed a sampling-related dispute that began when rap group
2 Live Crew sampled parts of Roy Orbison’s “Pretty Woman.” The Court held that a
parody—even a commercial parody for which permission was sought and then denied—
could be a fair use of the composition it mocked.18 The Court also suggested that other,
non-parodic, “transformative uses” could qualify as fair use.19 But subsequent case law
has not established anything like the (relatively) safe harbor that parody enjoys.
A unique and interesting case arose after the Beastie Boys sampled a three-note
16Id. at 182.
17See, e.g., Williams v. Broadus, 99 Civ. 10957 (MBM), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12894 (S.D.N.Y.
August 27, 2001) (holding that a genuine factual issue existed whether plaintiff Marley Marl’s song,
which sampled Otis Redding’s “Hard to Handle,” was itself an unauthorized derivative work, which would
exonerate defendant Snoop Dogg for sampling Marley Marl’s song); Fantasy, Inc. v. La Face Records,
No. C 96-4384 SC ENE, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9068 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 1997) (dismissing the
plaintiff’s complaint for creating an unauthorized derivative work because the sampled recording, made
in 1971, predated federal protection for sound recordings, which did not occur until 1972); Jarvis v. A&M
Records, 827 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1993) (denying summary judgment for defendant group C&C Music
Factory because it might have infringed by sampling a qualitatively important keyboard part and short but
qualitatively important lyrical phrases from a song by plaintiff composer Boyd Jarvis).
18Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581-85 (1994).
19Id. at 579.
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melodic phrase—C, D-flat, C, played on the flute over an overblown background C—
from Newton’s composition “Choir.”20 The Beastie Boys had licensed the sound record-
ing from Newton’s record label. But they had not licensed the underlying composition
from Newton himself, who owned the publishing rights. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s holding that the Beastie Boys’ use was de minimis, applying an ordinary
observer interpretation of that exception to infringement.21 The court held that the three
notes were “ ‘a common building block tool.’ that ‘has been used over and over again
by major composers in the 20th century.’ ”22
Two years later, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films held that no de minimis
threshold applied to sound recordings.23 “100 Miles and Runnin’,” a song by N.W.A.,
sampled two seconds from a guitar solo of the George Clinton song “Get Off Your
Ass and Jam.” The two-second sample was a recording of three notes from a single
chord played in rapid succession (what musicians call an arpeggio). “100 Miles and
Runnin’ ” was used in the movie I Got the Hook-Up without a synchronization license
for the sound recording.24 The court read Section 114(b) of the copyright code, which
explicitly excludes “entirely . . . independently created” works from the reach of the
reproduction and derivative-works rights of sound recording copyrights,25 to imply the
converse: that any work not entirely independently created infringes.26 The end result
20Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 2003).
21Id. at 1193 (“To say that a use is de minimis because no audience would recognize the appropriation
is thus to say that the use is not sufficiently significant.”).
22Id. at 1196 (quoting testimony defendants’ expert Dr. Lawrence Ferrara).
23410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). In other words, the court held that, for sound recordings, the de minimis
threshold is zero.
24The musical composition had received a synchronization license. Id. at 796.
2517 U.S.C. §114(b) (2000).
26Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800.
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is that in the Sixth Circuit (Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, and Michigan) there is no de
minimis threshold for the infringement of copyrighted sound recordings. Or, as put it:
“Get a license or do not sample.”27 The court allowed for the possibility of fair use
but did not rule on that issue.28 While other circuits may reject this approach in the
future, Bridgeport has effectively become the law of the land for the time being. Since
most recordings are marketed nationwide, infringement plaintiffs will generally have
the opportunity to file in the Sixth Circuit.
The copyright policy of Bridgeport, along with other cases holding that sampling can
be copyright infringement, motivates this chapter’s analysis. Should copyright holders
enjoy a strong property right in samples—small fragments of larger works? Or would it
be more efficient for copyright law treat some samples as too small to infringe?
3.3 A Model of Sequential Musical Creation
This section explores the assumption that samplers negotiate with licensors for the use
of existing works, rather than taking input prices as given from a market for samples.
The prevailing music-industry practice is to negotiate sample licenses on a case-by-case
basis. Although some copyright owners offer a menu of licensing fees, with licenses
available to all comers at a certain price, most copyright owners engage in individual




3.3.1 Setting up the model
Suppose that a new piece of music requires using a digital sample of one existing piece
of copyrighted music. Assume that the new derivative work will have no value without
incorporating the sample.29 In addition, assume that the new piece of music definitely
infringes both the composition and sound recording copyrights in the sampled piece of
music. If the sampler failed to obtain licenses from both copyright holders, then he or
she would be found liable and his or her payoff would be significantly negative. Thus,
without licenses the new work will not be produced.
The original, sampled work would yield value to consumers of v, which reflects the
combined value of its recording and underlying composition (experienced as a unified
whole by listeners). The composer and recording artist of the existing work must both
make their contributions for the existing work to have value; if either declines to produce
her contribution, the existing work has zero value and is not created. The new, sample-
based work has a value to consumers of q. The creator of the sample-based song is both
composer and recording artist for that song.
Musicians have fixed costs of production, which include the costs of capital (e.g.
recording equipment) and labor (e.g. session musicians), and zero variable costs. The
fixed costs of production to specific to each of the three works are: cDW for the new,
sample-based work; cSR for the preexisting sound recording; and cMC for the preexisting
musical composition.
The optimal marginal cost of information once it has been created is (very close to)
29The assumption that the derivative work loses all its value without the sample will be relaxed later in
the chapter.
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zero, but copyright law allows copyright owners to maintain a price for their goods that
is meaningfully greater than zero. The parameters describing the consequences of this
feature of copyright law are as follows: Copyright holders can collect revenue equal to
a fraction π of their works’ value to consumers. Society experiences deadweight loss
l every period a work is under copyright. Both π and l are functions of the duration
of copyright and the social discount rate, but making that explicit does not affect the
model’s basic implications.
Thus, the total social value will be positive for each work under the following con-
ditions [the “positive social value conditions”]:
• For the new, sample-based song: q (1− l)− cDW > 0
• For the existing, sampled song: (v + q) (1− l)− cMC − cSR − cDW > 0
The goal of the model is to demonstrate that even when these positive social value
conditions hold, one or both songs might not be created. This is true even with perfect
information, risk-neutrality of all agents, and zero transaction costs (all of which the
model assumes).
3.3.2 Division of profit: The source of inefficiency
What will drive the model’s results are two key facts together with insights about bar-
gaining, credible threats, and backward induction. First, sampling may occur long after
the sampled work is created. The sampler’s identity is not known when the original,
sampled work is created, making an ex ante agreement impossible. If the sampler
stands to make profits but the sampled musicians would fall short (looking ahead to
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sales of their work and the Nash-bargaining outcome of licensing negotiations), there
is no way the sampler can promise to give the sampled musicians a better deal—the
sampler doesn’t know he wants to be a sampler yet, because the original work doesn’t
exist yet.
Second, if the original work exists and the sampler chooses to sample it, the sam-
pler does not know a license is necessary until after sinking her costs of producing her
sample-based song. This stems from the institutional details of musical production. A
musician often does not know what sample is desired until she spends the studio time to
create a song with that sample. This makes licensing before creation of the sample-based
work very rare. Given that, if the sampler stands to fall short of making a profit (looking
ahead to sales of her work and the Nash-bargaining outcome of licensing negotiations),
there is no way for the sampler to make a credible threat not to create the sample-based
song—if licensing negotiations have started, the sampler’s production costs are already
sunk.
The model presented here is an adaptation of a model by Green and Scotchmer that
focused on the patent context, particularly the issue of patents for basic research.30 In
the context of sequential innovation, where basic research may lead to commercially
valuable products, a danger exists that—without patent protection—basic researchers
will not have sufficient incentives for their research. This can occur even when that
basic research and all the commercially marketable products it would lead to would
30See Jerry Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation, 26 RAND
J. ECON. 20 (1995), particularly the presentation in SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCEN-
TIVES135-42 (2004).
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have net positive social value.
The contribution of this chapter is to demonstrate that the problem is reciprocal. Not
only can the absence of intellectual property protection endanger the creation of up-
stream works, the presence of intellectual property protection can endanger the creation
of downstream works. When society would benefit from both works, the incentives of
both copyright owners of sampled works and the musicians who sample matter.
The game play proceeds as follows:
1. The values of all variables are known and taken as given.
• Consumer demand determines the value of each work, v and q.
• Music production technology and the idiosyncrasies of each work determine
the cost, cXX , to each musician.
• The parameters π and l are commonly known.
• Only the identity of the sampler is not known to the creators of the sampled
work.
2. The composer of the original work decides whether to create the composition.
3. The recording artist of the original work decides whether to make the recording.
4. If either the composition or the recording is not created, the original work will not
exist and the game ends. If the original work does exist, the sampling musician
decides whether to create the sample-based work.
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5. If the sample-based work exists, then the sampler must obtain two licenses, one
from the composer and one from the recording artist, or else the sample-based
work cannot be released commercially and garner revenue.
Solving the model requires backward induction and thus starts with the fifth and last
step: licensing negotiations. Bargaining among the sampler and the samplees takes place
according to the three-person licensing game described in Appendix A. As a result of






, the Nash solution. As Appendix A shows,
the Nash result is approximated as the negotiating parties’ subjective (commonly held)
discount factor approaches unity.
At the fourth step, the sampling musician decides whether to produce her song or
not. She will do so whenever the revenue she can collect exceeds the licensing fees she







Thus, society will lose out on sample-based works that have positive social value when:





In other words, when the sampler’s one-third share of the profit from the derivative work
is not great enough to cover the fixed costs of producing the work, then the derivative
work will not be produced.
This is partly a result of the three-way split of the derivative work’s profits. But at its
root, it is a result of the institutional setting; samplers typically do not seek out licensors
until their sample-based works have already been created. This makes the case of ex ante
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licensing, more relevant in the patent context of Scotchmer and Green, unusual in this
context. Only ex post licensing is realistic in the music industry, when songs generally
have to be created and heard to be evaluated. If ex ante licensing were possible, then the
costs as well as the revenues of the derivative work could be shared among the original
sound recording copyright holder, the original musical composition copyright holder,
and the sampler.
At the third step, the recording artist of the sampled work decides whether to record
the composition, if it exists. The compulsory license for cover versions compositions
gives the recording artist of the sampled work leverage to pay the composer a fixed
fraction m < 1
2
of the sampled work’s revenue. The composer does worse than the two-




. As mentioned above, a recording artist can cover
a composition without the composer’s permission if it has been commercially released
once. But this compulsory license for second, third, and nth versions has historically in-
fluenced the licensing fee for the first recording of a composition as well. If a composer
refused to grant the recording artist a license to be the first to record a composition,
the recording artist would merely have to wait until another artist recorded the song,
at which point the recording artist could immediately take advantage of the compul-
sory license. Thus, in music-industry practice, composers typically receive the current
statutory rate as a royalty on sales of recordings.31
Thus, at the third step, the recording artist decides whether the fraction (1−m) of
31See 17 U.S.C. §115(a)(2); see also Passman, supra. The current rate is 9.1 cents per copy sold or 1.75
cents per minute, whichever is greater. U.S. Copyright Office, Mechanical License Royalty Rates (May
30, 2006), at http://www.copyright.gov/carp/m200a.html (last visited May 17, 2009).
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the revenue vπ from the sampled work is sufficient to cover her costs cSR. At the second
step, the composer decides whether the fraction m of the revenue vπ from the sampled
work is sufficient to cover her costs cMC .
Steps two and three determine whether any music is produced at all. If the composer
and recording artist of a work cannot cover their costs through sales of their own song
plus licensing fees from the song that samples theirs, they will not produce. The social
value of the original, sampled work includes the value of the new, sampling work that
depends on it. Society will lose out on two works that collectively have positive social
value when:
(v + q) (1− l)− cMC − cSR − cDW > 0 but
[












The logic of these equations is similar. If one of the original creators cannot cover
its costs—even with the help of receiving one-third of the revenue from the derivative
work—then neither the original nor the derivative work will be produced.
Two inefficiencies are possible. The creators of either the prior, sampled work or the
later, sampling work could fail to meet their incentive constraints. It might seem counter-
intuitive that inefficiency could arise from a perfect information, zero-transaction-cost
model with no uncertainty and risk-neutral agents. The driving force of the inefficiency
is that musicians sink their costs before negotiating licenses, whether for samples of or
samples used in their work. Viewed from another angle, the source of the inefficiency
is the timing of the agents’ actions. The sequence of events means that a single piece of
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information is missing when production occurs: the identity of the licensor or licensee
they will need to negotiate with to authorize the use of a sample.
3.3.3 Comparing two copyright regimes
The preceding subsection describes the inequality conditions that determine when so-
cially desirable works will not be created. Those conditions resulted in part from the
assumption that the sample infringed the original work’s copyright. Making the oppo-
site assumption, that the sample does not infringe the original work’s copyright, would
alter the conditions for inefficiency as follows. Inefficiency would occur whenever any
one of the following pairs of inequalities holds:
q (1− l)− cDW > 0 but qπ < cDW
(v + q) (1− l)− cMC − cSR − cDW > 0 but (1−m) vπ < cSR
(v + q) (1− l)− cMC − cSR − cDW > 0 but mvπ < cMC
Each pair of inequalities has a positive social value conditions and an incentive con-
straint; there is one pair for each musician in the model, as in the previous subsection.
The only difference is that the licensing-fee terms, q
3
π, have been eliminated.
Switching to a regime in which samples do not receive copyright protection tilts the
likelihood toward the sampling musician being able to meet her incentive constraint.
In particular, society gains sample-based derivative works—relative to the copyright
regime—whenever qπ
3
< cDW < qπ and the recording artist and composer of the origi-
nal work can meet their incentive constraints without licensing fees, i.e., (1−m) vπ >
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cSR and mvπ > cMC . When these conditions hold, a no-copyright regime produces two
works whereas the copyright-in-samples regime produces only one work, the original
song. That is the marginal benefit of eliminating copyright in samples.
At the same time, moving to a no-copyright regime means it is less likely that the
sampled musicians will meet their incentive constraint. Under this regime, society loses
original works—relative to the copyright regime—whenever (1−m) vπ < cSR <[
(1−m) vπ + qπ
3
]





, provided that the sampling artist
can still afford the cost of production while paying licensing fees i.e., qπ
3
> cDW . When
these conditions hold, a no-copyright regime produces no works at all, because at least
one of the creators of the original work cannot meet her incentive constraint. Those lost
works are the cost of shifting away from copyright protection for samples. Under these
same conditions, the regime with copyright in samples would foster the production of
both works.
Which regime is more efficient, copyright or no copyright in samples, depends on the
distributions of the random variables v, q, cMC , cSR, and cDW , as well as the parameters
π, l, and m. The specifics of these distributions and parameters determine whether
the value of the works gained outweighs the value of the works lost; in general, either
regime could be more efficient.
Here is an example where a no-copyright regime is more efficient than a copyright-
in-samples regime. Let U(a, b) denote the uniform distribution over the interval [a, b]
and assume the following:
• v ∼ U(0, 4)
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• cMC ∼ U(0, 0.9)
• cSR ∼ U(0, 0.9)
• q ∼ U(0, 4)
• cDW ∼ U(0, 2)
• π = 0.5
• l = 0.25
• m = 0.5
Under these assumptions, the no-copyright regime is superior approximately 13.6 per-
cent of the time, with derivative works of mean value 1.11 being lost. The total gain to
having no copyright in samples is thus 0.151 on average (13.6 percent times 1.11). Also
under the above assumptions, the copyright-in-samples regime is superior 6.59 percent
of the time, with original and derivative works of combined mean value 2.24 being lost.
The total loss from having no copyright in samples is thus 0.148 on average. The gain
to switching to the no-copyright regime exceeds the cost. The no-copyright regime is
more efficient under the above assumptions.
The above is just one example of what might happen in the sequential innovation
context between a sampling musician and the musicians she samples. It proves, by
counterexample, that copyright protection for samples can be less efficient than having
no copyright protection for samples. This is true even in the absence of transaction costs,
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uncertainty, risk-aversion, imperfect information, externalities, or other market imper-
fections. The only barriers to efficiency are the timing of production and the necessity
of sinking one’s production costs before one can grant or obtain a license to sample.
3.3.4 Extension: Multiple samples within one derivative work
A straightforward way to extend the model from the single-sample to the multiple-
sample case is to approximate the result of n-way bargaining with the Nash solution:
each party receives 1
n
of the bargaining surplus. In the model, the parties are bargaining
over the returns to the sample-based work, qπ. With one sample, each party received
qπ
3
, because there were three parties at the bargaining table: the original composer, the
original recording artist, and the sampling musician. With two samples, there would
be five parties at the bargaining table (two original composers, two original recording




where n is the number of samples






As the number of samples increases, the sampling musician’s revenue approaches zero.
Each licensor’s licensing revenue also approaches zero (meaning that each licensor’s
incentive constraint approaches what it would be if the sample-based work did not exist).
This simple extension of the model captures a kernel of truth about the real world of
sample licensing. In practice, musicians who use multiple samples per song—creating,
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say, a collage of twenty or more existing songs—cannot hope to obtain the necessary
licenses without pushing their revenue to zero or less.32
3.4 Extension: Adjustment to sample length is possible
The model of the previous section assumes that the entire value q of the downstream
work depends on its sample of the upstream work. In that context, one can only com-
pare two extremes of copyright law: copyright protection for samples or no such copy-
right protection. In this section, I extend the model such that: (a) only a fraction of
the downstream work’s value depends on the sample and (b) the fraction of value that
does depend on the sample is proportional to the sample’s length in time. This allows
investigation of a third policy option: copyright protection for samples with limitations
and exceptions.
The de minimis threshold for copyright infringement embodies the idea that some
uses of existing music are so small that the law should not recognize them as violations.
It was the subject of the recent Bridgeport decision, which ruled that no de minimis
threshold exists for sound recordings analogous to that for compositions. The de min-
imis threshold lends itself straightforwardly to quantitative modeling. Another impor-
tant limitation on copyright, fair use, involves a larger set of considerations and would
require a richer set of variables to analyze. But one consideration in fair use analysis is
the quantity used of the original work, meaning that a model of the de minimis threshold
32The possibility of licensing fees that exceed the sales revenue of the sample-based work could be
captured with a model where each sample has its own market with a market-determined (rather than
bargaining-determined) price. In a market-based model, nothing would constrain the samples from ex-
ceeding sales revenue.
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takes one step in the direction of modeling fair use.
Instituting such a threshold allows the law some breathing room, which could have
important benefits in terms of samplers’ incentives and in terms of avoiding the trans-
action costs of licensing. The de minimis threshold will also have the consequence of
providing some samplers with the incentive to shorten their samples, to take advantage
of copyright law’s choice to limit its own reach.
3.4.1 Revising the model
Suppose that copyright subsists in any fraction [measured in time] of a musical work
y ∈ (0, 1). Each sampler, in the one-sample set up, will have a desired sample length
y∗. The new, sample-based work has an associated loss function L(y) which measures
the proportional loss in value from adjusting the length of a sample downward from y∗.







with y∗∗ ∈ (0, 1) denoting the desired sample length and λ ∈ (1,Λ) for some large,
finite Λ parameterizing the degree of distaste for moving away from the most desired
sample. Higher λ means more distaste for deviations from the optimum. As a conse-
quence of this functional form, L(y) ∈ (0, 1).33 There is an implicit—and admittedly
imperfect, since it puts the qualitative dimension of sample choice aside—assumption
that shorter samples contribute less to the value of the derivative work, and thus it is
most desirable to decline to compensate the tiniest samples.
33I assume that the licensor never wishes to grant (and the licensee never wishes to use) a larger sample
than desired. Thus, there is no need for a quadratic, i.e. two-sided, loss function.
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Given this loss function, the commercial value of the new, sample-based work is
now q · [1− L(y)]. Under what circumstances will the musician reduce the sample and
avoid the licensing fees? Whenever q · [1 − L(y)] ≥ q
3
(the musician’s approximate
share of the profits after licensing)—that is, whenever L(y) ≤ 2
3
. The y that makes this
equation hold with equality will depend on the sampler’s particular parameters y∗ and
λ, and implicitly depends on the equilibrium of the three-person bargaining game.
As a result of making the sampler’s decision problem more flexible, we now have
three cases:
1. The sampler need neither license nor adjust he sample, because y∗ < y. If the
sampler’s desired sample length is below the de minimis threshold of copyright
law, the sampler will earn qπ − cDW whenever that expression is positive. The
only danger of social loss is whether qπ
3
was needed to incentivize the preexisting
sound recording or musical composition.
2. The sampler can alter the sample, even though y∗ ≥ y, to make the chosen y < y.
In this case, all we need for the sample-based work to be created is:
q · [1− L(y)]π ≥ cDW




)y. [To see this, set
L(y) = 2
3
.] Again, the harm to social welfare involves any original, sampled
works for which qπ
3
was needed to incentivize the preexisting sound recording or
musical composition.




. Then the original inequalities hold from the simplest case above (the
case without adjustment of samples).
3.4.2 Three different copyright regimes
Determining the optimal level of y requires an analysis of what works are gained or lost
to society under different scenarios, corresponding to different levels of y. In each of
the three scenarios, there are up to to three cases to analyze, corresponding to different
ranges of the sampler’s value of y∗ in relation to y. Throughout the discussion, I mean
to refer to works with positive social value.34
No copyright over derivative works. This corresponds to y = 1. Under that condi-
tion, any value of y∗ puts us into case (1) above. No sample of any length necessi-
tates obtaining a license. Socially valuable derivative works are not created when-
ever qπ < cDW . Nor are they created if either (1−m) vπ < cSR or mvπ < cMC ,
since the creators of the original, sampled song cannot make a positive profit.
Complete copyright over derivative works. Next consider the consequence of y = 0.
Here, only case (3) is relevant, because there is no de minimis threshold and thus
there is no reason in this simple setup for the sampler to alter the sample length.
Society gains creative works with respect to the no-copyright scenario when both
original artists cross the profitability threshold:










34See the end of the preamble to Section 3.3 for the three positive social value conditions.
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Society loses socially valuable sample-based works because of the need to license
when creating the derivative work slips below profitability:(q
3
)
π < cDW < qπ
Therefore, there are benefits and costs from moving between a regime of no copy-
right at all to a regime of complete copyright.
Copyright over derivative works with a de minimis threshold. Now suppose that y
is strictly greater than zero, but is still less than one. The particular costs and
benefits of moving to this intermediate level of copyright protection determine the
optimal level of y.
Case (1): y∗ ≤ y. Among sample-based works with y∗ below the de minimis
threshold, we gain any works for which the following relations hold:
qπ
3
< cDW < qπ; mvπ > cMC ; and (1−m) vπ > cSR
We lose both the original, preexisting work and the sample-based works for which




meaning that the sample-based work would have been profitable, had the original
works come into being;
mvπ < cMC or (1−m) vπ < cSR
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meaning that without licensing revenue, at least one of the copyright owners of








meaning that with the licensing revenue, the copyright owners of the original song
would have made a profit, and thus seen fit to produce the original work.







y. In this adjusted-sample case, we first need to
revise the positive social value conditions slightly, to reflect the derivative work’s
decline in value:
• Derivative work: [1− L(y)]q (1− l)− cDW > 0
• Original recording: {(1−m) v + q(1− L(y)]} (1− l)− cSR − cDW > 0
• Original composition: {mv + q[1− L(y)]} (1− l)− cMC − cDW > 0
Assuming that those conditions hold, we can now discuss the socially valuable
works that would be gained or lost as compared to the complete-copyright sce-
nario. Among sample-based works with y∗ lying between the de minimis thresh-
old and the largest sample length y that is worth incurring the loss L(y) to adjust,
we gain sample-based works for which:
qπ
3
< cDW < [1− L(y)] · qπ
which specifies that the derivative work, which was not profitable if the full sample
was licensed, would be profitable with an adjusted sample. For this gain in the
number of sample-based works created to occur, it also must be true that both
mvπ > cMC and (1−m) vπ > cSR
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which guarantees that the original, sampled song will still be created, even without
the licensing revenue.
As in Case (1), we lose both the original, preexisting work and the sample-based




meaning that the sample-based work would have been profitable, had the original
works come into being;
mvπT < cMC or (1−m) vπ < cSR
meaning that without licensing revenue, at least one of the copyright owners of









meaning that with the licensing revenue, the copyright owners of the original song
would have made a profit, and thus seen fit to produce the original work. These
conditions for losing the original work are the same as in case (1) because, re-
gardless of the sampler’s particular y∗, the requirement for a work to be lost is
that it was being made before and that it will no longer be licensed thanks to the
de minimis exception and the ability to adjust sample length downward.
In addition, society could lose some value from samples being adjusted in deriva-
tive works that were already being made under the complete-copyright scenario.
For this to occur, cDW would have to be less than qπ3 , so that the work was
getting made in the complete-copyright scenario. But if it’s also the case that
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[1 − L(y)] · qπ > qπ
3
< cDW , then the sampler will adjust the sample to make
more profit. In that event, society gets only the fraction [1 − L(y] times the orig-
inal social value of the sample-based work. That loss in social value must also
count in the ledger when assessing the gain and loss from introducing a de min-








y. In this event, no works are gained or lost, nor is any
social value lost, with respect to the complete-copyright scenario. No sampler
with a y∗ this high will find it profitable to adjust their sample; he or she will
either license the sample or choose not to produce the sample-based work at all.
3.4.3 The optimal threshold for copyright protection
As in the previous section, the optimal policy will depend on the distributions of the
random variables and the values of the parameters. Some general conclusions might be
drawn about which regime the cost-benefit calculation would be likely to recommend.
In contrast to Green and Scotchmer’s concerns in the patent context about whether basic
research will occur, the copyright context suggests that policy makers should have con-
cerns about balancing the incentives of both upstream and downstream creators (rather
than having a primary concern on just the upstream creators).
In the music context, ex ante licensing does occur, as when copyright holders hire
other musicians to remix their songs. But many samplers do not know in advance which
samples, sounds, and combinations of sounds will occur to them and sound good to-
gether. With ex post licensing, the creator of the derivative work typically has no op-
105
portunity to share their costs with the copyright owners of the original work. This is
especially true in light of the distance in time that can often occur between samplee
and sampler, described in subsection 3.3.2. This makes possible a number of situations
in which samplers’ incentive problem results in derivative works not being created. In
those instances, copyright’s regime for sampling can backfire. When the derivative work
is not created, the copyright holder in the preexisting work receives no licensing revenue.
This endangers the preexisting work’s creator’s ability to solve his or her incentive prob-
lem.
A positive de minimis threshold gives copyright law a mechanism to put some
derivative works outside the reach of copyright, alleviating the incentive problem for
some creators of derivative works and potentially providing some balance. While not
perfect, sample length is an attractive policy lever because it is objective, not requir-
ing private parties or judges to engage in aesthetic assessments to understand the reach
of copyright law. But the de minimis threshold may entice some samplers to alter the
samples they use from their desired lengths. That consequence has both advantages and
drawbacks, in terms of the number of works created and the value of the works created.
With a relatively small de minimis threshold, however, both these effects will be rela-
tively small. Based on the simple model presented so far, it seems possible that some
positive de minimis threshold would have broad social benefits.
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has addressed the problems facing creators of derivative works in the music
industry, particularly those musicians engaged in sampling or collage. Specifying a
model of the division of profit between the copyright holders of preexisting works and
the creator of a prospective derivative work, I have attempted to isolate what I see as the
fundamental inefficiency involved. Because of factors the separation in time between
the original work and the derivative work, I have argued that society has reason to be
concerned about both samplees’ and samplers’ incentives at the same time, for the sake
of both groups.
Although the model of Section 3.3 focuses on the difficulties that can arise in sample
licensing because of non-contractibility, in truth the situation is both better and worse
than that for musicians who sample. On the plus side, musicians can adjust the samples
they use, how may samples they use, or even alter their method of musical borrowing
from sampling to “replaying” small pieces of compositions themselves (which reduces
the licensing burden to one type of license). Musicians can also adjust the method by
which they release their music to the public; in essence, they have choice over their
particular business model. The tradeoffs involved can result in differently situated mu-
sicians making different business-model choices.35 Consideration of copyright law’s
policy toward sampling should take into account the flexibility that samplers have on
the margins of both artistic choices and business models.
35A numerical simulation with calibrated assumptions about various music-industry parameters can
illustrate how different business models become more and less attractive under which conditions. See
Peter DiCola, “An Economic Model of Sampling, Cover Versions, and Musical Collage,” (working paper
on file with author, 2006).
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Extending the model to the multiple-sample situation shows that the real-world sit-
uation of musicians who sample can be worse than the stylized model suggests. More-
over, market imperfections like transaction costs, uncertainty, and asymmetric informa-
tion would exacerbate the division-of-profit problem. For example, adding transaction
costs to the copyright-in-samples regime would create a deadweight loss that would lead
the copyright regime to fare worse (under any assumptions) than the no-copyright-in-
samples regime. The appropriate policy solution to the inefficiencies involved in sample
licensing requires a detailed investigation of the institutional features of the music in-
dustry, a much longer project that I have participated in separately.36 This chapter seeks
to lay a foundation for that work by demonstrating that one cannot determine the op-
timal policy with a simplistic appeal to property rights, as the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals took in Bridgeport. The division-of-profit problem, applied to the context of
sample licensing, shows that the interaction between upstream and downstream authors
is complex enough to resist such a priori generalizations.
36See KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW AND CULTURE OF
DIGITAL SAMPLING (Duke Univ. Press, forthcoming 2010).
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Appendix 3.A: A three-person licensing game
Three people bargain to divide a pie of size q. Player 1 is the licensee, while Players
2 and 3 are the licensors. Their positions are asymmetric. Player 1 deals with each
other player in bilateral negotiations. Players 2 and 3 act simultaneously during each
round and cannot communicate to strategize or collude. But all parties have complete
information about the structure of the game and the potential payoffs.
Negotiations continue indefinitely. The discount factor is the same for all players
and is δ ∈ (0, 1]. Deals are binding once made but no bankruptcy allowed. So if the pie
is not produced, no money is owed. The breakdown payoff for each player is zero.
When a deal is accepted early, the player gets paid in terms of that periods dollars,
with no further discounting, even if the game carries on and the pie is not produced
until a later period.37 If one bilateral deal is made between two players (say, Player 1
and Player 2) but the other bilateral deal (between Player 1 and Player 3) is not, then








between the first offeror and the first offeree.
Game play proceeds as follows:
1. In round one, Player 1 simultaneously solicits offers from Players 2 and 3, result-
ing in the following payoffs for (Player 1, Player 2, Player 3): (q−a1−b1, a1, b1).
Players 2 and 3 each make their offers. There are four possible scenarios, based
on the offers made in the first round of bargaining.
37See Suchan Chae & Jeong-Ae Yang, An N-Person Pure Bargaining Game, 62 J. ECON. THEORY 86,
89 (1994).
38See Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Game, 50 ECONOMETRICA 97 (1982).
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(a) If Player 1 accepts both offers, then the game ends, with payoffs equal to:
(q − a1 − b1, a1, b1).
(b) If Player 1 accepts 2s price but rejects 3s, then we have a bilateral game
between 1 and 3, in which 1 makes the first offer. The remaining pie size is:









(c) If Player 1 rejects 2s price but accepts 3s, then we have a bilateral game
between 1 and 2, in which 1 makes the first offer. The remaining pie size is:









(d) If 1 rejects both 2 and 3 price quotes, then we reach round two.
2. In round two, a similar 3-person game to round one is played for a pie size δq and
with the difference that player 1 make the first offers. In the event that the game
reaches round two, there are four scenarios:
(a) Both Players 2 and 3 can accept, ending the game with payoffs: (δ(q− a2−
b2), δa2, δb2).
(b) Player 2 could accept while player 3 rejects. This launches a bilateral game
between Player 1 and Player 3, with Player 3 making the first offer and a pie









(c) Player 2 could reject while player 3 accepts. This launches a bilateral game
between Player 1 and Player 2, with Player 2 offering first and a pie size of










(d) Both Players 2 and 3 could reject. Now we play the original three-person
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game, with Players 2 and 3 offering first, for a pie of size δ2q. The structure
is thus recursive. Call the payoffs in the subgame (δ2(q − a − b), δ2a, δ2b),
with no subscripts on the offers.
To solve this infinitely repeated game, I follow the solution method outlined in Gib-
bons.39 Taking the second round of bargaining first, what would it take for both Player
2 and Player 3 to accept Player 1s offers? In other words, what are the incentive con-
straints for a subgame-perfect equilibrium?
The first four conditions determine the optimal offers by Player 1 in round two of
bargaining, a∗2 and b
∗
2, as a function of the continuation payoffs a and b in the event of
the entire supergame being repeated (i.e., when both Player 2 and Player 3 reject Player
1’s offers in the second round). These conditions can be understood as Player 1 avoiding
creating a prisoners’ dilemma among Player 2 and Player 3. The final three conditions
consider what would it take, in the first round of bargaining, for Player 1 to accept both
Player 2’s and Player 3s offers.
1. Player 2’s payoff δa2 must be greater than or equal to δ2a, the continuation payoff
if neither Player 2 nor Player 3 accepts.
2. Player 3’s payoff δb2 must be greater than or equal to δ2b, the continuation payoff
if neither Player 2 nor Player 3 accepts.
3. Player 2’s payoff δa2 must also be greater than or equal to δ
2q−δb2
1+δ
, which is Player
39ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 68-71 (1992) (citing Rubinstein,
supra, and Avner Shaked & John Sutton, Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bar-
gaining Model, 52 ECONOMETRICA 1351 (1984)).
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2’s payoff if Player 3 accepts while Player 2 rejects.
4. Player 3’s payoff δb2 must also be greater than or equal to δ
2q−δa2
1+δ
, which is Player
3’s payoff if Player 2 accepts while Player 3 rejects.
5. It must be the case that q− a1− b1 ≥ δ(q− a∗2− b∗2), so that it is worthwhile from
Player 1’s perspective not to reject both offers.
6. It must also be the case that q − a1 − b1 ≥ δq−a11+δ , so that Player 1 does not have
incentive to accept Player 2’s offer but reject Player 3’s offer.
7. Finally, and similarly, it must be true that q − a1 − b1 ≥ δq−b11+δ , so that Player 1
does not have incentive to accept Player 3’s offer but reject Player 2’s offer.
This determines the optimal offers by Player 2 and Player 3 in round one, as a func-
tion of the second-round continuation payoffs a and b. In other words, to calculate the
equilbrium, we will aim to set a∗1(a) = a and b
∗
1(b) = b. Conditions (3) and (4) imply
(1) and (2), but not the reverse. So one must solve (3) and (4), the binding incentive
constraints, for Player 1s optimal second-round offers. Then, based on that, we can get
Player 1s best second-round payoff. Next, one can solve equation (5) based on that re-
sult. It turns out that condition (5) implies conditions (6) and (7), and the game is solved.






δ2 − δ + 2
2δ + 4
,












as δ approaches 1.
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Chapter 4
Employment and Wage Effects of Radio Concentration
4.1 A Spate of Radio Layoffs
A typical late-1990s headline about the radio industry lamented: “Local Radio Loses a
Distinctive Voice.”1 Another reported:“Radio News Facing Cutbacks: Consolidation in
the Industry Brings Leaner Staffing.”2 A more pointed article offered a metaphor: “Lo-
calism Vanishing as N[ew] H[ampshire] Radio Is ’McDonaldized.’ ”3 Such accounts
often tell the story of a single veteran disk jockey, ousted from his or her longtime on-
air slot, often at the decision of large companies like Clear Channel, Viacom, Radio
One, or their pre-merger predecessors. Many commentators point to the brisk pace of
ownership consolidationthe phenomenon of mergers and acquisitions leading to a more
concentrated market structure in the industryas the primary cause of local radio employ-
ees losing their jobs. One article quotes an estimate that “10,000 radio-related jobs”
1Tom Feran, “Local Radio Loses a Distinctive Voice,” CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, June 3, 1999, at 1E.
2Steve Knoll, “Radio News Facing Cutbacks: Consolidation in the Industry Brings Leaner Staffing,”
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1996, reprinted in CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 31, 1996, at 3C.
3Jack Kenny, “Localism Vanishing as N.H. Radio Is ‘McDonaldized,’ ” N.H. BUS. REV., Oct. 23,
1998, at 1.
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disappeared between 1996 and 2002.4 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 eliminated
the national ownership limit for owners of radio stations while relaxing the limits on
local radio ownership.5 In this chapter, I examine how increased concentration of radio
station ownership relates to employment and wages in three radio-industry occupations
by analyzing data from the seven years following the Telecommunications Act (1996 to
2003).
While the employment effects of consolidation have economic importance in their
own right, they also fall under the purview of the FCCs major policy goals of ensur-
ing localism and fostering diversity.6 One journalist in Detroit, where four firms garner
over eighty percent market share,7 argues that “radio programming leaves little room to
showcase local musicians, and there has been an invasion of syndicated shows and on-air
personalities spliced in from distant cities via computer” and observes that “[s]yndicated
hosts . . . threaten local jobs.”8 The author concludes, under the heading “Loss of Jobs,”
that “[r]adio analysts are convinced that many practices the big chains are responsible
forthe de-emphasis on local contentsave[] money, but will ultimately kill local radio.”9
A radio station’s choice to carry remotely produced programming, while it may satisfy
some listeners’ preferences, may simultaneously detract from localism and reduce em-
ployment. To the extent that consolidated firms have a stronger tendency to rely on syn-
4Todd Spencer, “Radio Killed the Radio Star,” SALON.COM (Oct. 1, 2002), at
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/10/01/nab/.
5Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
6The FCC has cited three major, longstanding goals in its broadcast media policy: competition, diver-
sity, and localism. See, for example, Federal Communications Commission, Notice of Proposed Rule-
making, No. 02-249, 2 (Sept. 12, 2002).
7Source: BIA Financial Networks, Media Access Pro, data as of May 16, 2002.
8Susan Whitall, “Once Distinctive Sound Fades into Predictability; Media Giants Control What Music
Is Played,” DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 10, 2002, at 1.
9Id.
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dication, voice tracking technology, or national programming than smaller firms, larger
job losses (or smaller job gains) will accompany greater ownership concentration. Fur-
thermore, if media mergers lead to job losses on a local level, then media outlets could
become less familiar with and less responsive to the local communities in which they
are based. And thinner ranks of disk jockeys and news reporters may mean less diverse
choices of music and news stories. Empirical analysis shows that the FCC should con-
cern itself with the threat to localism and diversity that job losses (and, indirectly, wage
reductions) represent.
Common sense—as well as much anecdotal and qualitative evidence in the pub-
lic debate over media regulation—holds that media mergers have led to downsizing.
After all, the proponents of relaxed ownership rules argued that more restrictive rules
prevented media firms from exploiting economies of scale. That is to say, commen-
tators on all sides expected consolidators to centralize some functions that previously
existed separately in separately owned stations. But studies using aggregate data can
test these theories and verify anecdotal claims, like those quoted above from post-
Telecommunications-Act newspaper accounts. Quantitative analysis allows one to ask
more formally whether ownership consolidation has led to job losses or wage reduc-
tions. Furthermore, it allows one to estimate the magnitude of those relationships and
to determine whether different occupations within the radio industry have experienced
different levels of employment decreases and wage decreases.
Using data from the Occupational Employment Survey of the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, I estimate the effects of radio consolidation on employment and wages for
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three occupations: announcers, news reporters, and broadcast technicians. I find that,
comparing figures across metropolitan areas, an increase in the number of stations per
owner within a metropolitan area was associated with both lower employment levels and
lower wages during the years 1996 to 2003. Whether this represents a causal effect of
radio consolidation, in the sense that increasing the concentration of ownership within a
particular market over time would in fact lead to job losses and lower wages, is a more
difficult question. I conclude that the relationship between greater consolidation and
lower levels of employment and wages probably pre-dates the Telecommunications Act
of 1996; the data studied in this article do not answer definitively whether consolida-
tion “causes” job loss or wage reductions in the sense described above. Yet the strong
correlation between radio consolidation, job losses, and lower wages for common ra-
dio occupations remains an important fact for policymakers at the FCC as they seek to
promote localism and diversity in radio programming.
4.2 Industry Context
Beginning in the 1980s, Congress and the FCC passed statutes and adopted regula-
tions to relax the limits on national and local radio ownership.10 But the most dramatic
changes to ownership policy in radio arrived with the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
In that legislation, Congress repealed the national radio ownership limit, which previ-
ously capped a firms holdings at forty stations. Moreover, Congress raised the local
10For a fuller description of radio’s regulatory history, see PETER DICOLA & KRISTIN THOMSON,
RADIO DEREGULATION: HAS IT SERVED CITIZENS AND MUSICIANS? 5–16 (2002), available at
http://www.futureofmusic.org/research/radiostudy.cfm (last visited Apr. 3, 2005).
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radio ownership limit from a sliding scale of three to four stations, depending on the
total number of stations in a market, to a sliding scale of five to eight stations. As a
result, many stations changed hands and many firms merged. The national radio market
became much more concentrated; by spring 2002 the ten largest firms had two-thirds
market share and the two largest (Clear Channel and Viacom) combined for over forty
percent market share.11 Local radio markets became highly concentratedin almost ev-
ery metropolitan area, the four largest firms together had over seventy percent market
share.12 That figure generally exceeded ninety percent in smaller markets (that is, in all
but the fifty largest U.S. cities).13 This article will focus on local radio markets in order
to study the corresponding local labor markets for radio-industry occupations.
While advocating the relaxation or elimination of various media ownership rules,
both before the passage of the Telecommunications Act and later in debate over the
FCCs recent biennial review of its media ownership rules,14 media companies and some
commentators often argued that media companies were poised to benefit from economies
of scale if allowed to grow bigger and to centralize some operations.15 In other words,
two stations that each required ten employees when separately owned could, in the-
ory, be staffed by fewer than twenty employees when jointly owned. Implicit in the




14Federal Communications Commission, Report and Order in the Matter of 2002 Biennial Regulatory
Review, No. 03-127 (June 2, 2003).
15See, e.g., Bill Holland, “Telecommunications Act Signed: Legislation to Revamp Media Climate,”
BILLBOARD (Feb. 17, 1996) (“Scott Ginsburg, Evergreen Media chairman/CEO, says that signing the
bill into law ‘will lead to a tide of radio ownership consolidation and improved economies of scale for
radio broadcasters.’ ”).
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ployees needed to support the same number of broadcast outlets. If media companies
made good on their stated intentions, then one should observe lower employment levels
in more consolidated markets.
Theoretical predictions of the effect of radio consolidation on wages in particular oc-
cupations are more ambiguous. Decreased demand for labor resulting from economies
of scale could depress wages, based on a simple supply-and-demand diagram. But
surely such a model is too simple. Technological developments facilitated by economies
of scale could enhance productivity per worker. Macroeconomic trends could exert pres-
sure on industry-wide wages. Perhaps most importantly, layoffs might target employees
with above-average or below-average wages compared to the industry as a whole. The
wage effects of firms’ layoff choices will depend on many factors that are difficult to
observe, especially at the aggregate level, such as the particular organizational structure
of firms and the wage profile of the particular employees laid off.
New technologies and organizational strategies have indeed arisen in the wake of the
Telecommunications Act. First, large radio companies can now adopt “voice tracking”
technology. Voice tracking is the practice of broadcasting the show of a famous radio
announcer (or DJ) nationwide while trying to make the show seem local.16 Radio com-
panies can enjoy the cost savings that accompany syndication while appearing to tailor
its programming to communities’ needs. Second, radio companies now plan much of
their programming centrally. DJs have less choice; market-testing of ten-second song
16See, e.g., Anna Wilde Mathews, “From a Distance: A Giant Radio Chain Is Perfecting the Art Of
Seeming Local,” WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2002, at A1; Randy Dotinga, “Good Morning [Your Town
Here],” WIRED.COM (August 6, 2002), at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,54037,00.html
(last visited Apr. 3, 2005).
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snippets has become prevalent; and payola-like practices have allegedly affected pro-
gramming decisions. To the extent that more programming decisions occur centrally,
fewer DJs and program directors are needed.17 Third, there have been large radio firms
that appear to take advantage of their size to hire fewer broadcast technicians. Consider
the now-infamous incident in Minot, North Dakota, which arose when a train carry-
ing ammonia fertilizer derailed, releasing deadly ammonia gas.18 When local officials
sought to broadcast warnings on the radio, no one at the designated emergency broad-
cast station (KCJB, owned by Clear Channel) was available at the station to answer the
phone.19 The allocation of labor across radio stations delayed an emergency response
teams attempts alert to their local community. These three examples show that firms in
the radio industry have in fact attempted to exploit economies of scale.
Consolidation of operations like the engineering tasks performed by broadcast tech-
nicians represents centralization within a local market. What used to be two jobs in
a particular city becomes one job. Some centralization of programming occurs on a
local level as well. If two stations had separate radio newsrooms but become jointly
owned, the consolidator will probably close one of the newsrooms. The phenomenon of
“simulcasting” functions similarly. An owner of multiple stations within a market might
choose to rebroadcast all or part of one station’s programming on one of the jointly
owned stations within the same local market. One reason a firm might do this is to in-
crease signal reach; its broadcast towers could stand on either side of a large city, both
17See DICOLA & THOMSON, supra note 10, at 61-67.
18ERIC KLINENBERG, FIGHTING FOR AIR: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL AMERICA’S MEDIA 1–4
(2007); Jill Burcum, “Ammonia Cloud Engulfs Minot,” MINN. STAR-TRIB., Jan. 19, 2002, at 1A.
19See Jennifer 8. Lee, “On Minot, N.D., Radio, A Single Corporate Voice,” N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31,
2003, at C7.
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considered part of the same market. A decision to simulcast by a consolidating firm,
like other strategies of local centralization, will cause job losses.
Centralization on a national scale also shrinks radio-industry employment, but in a
more complicated fashion because of the interplay between the national and local levels
of organization. It is unclear whether the more consolidated local markets will experi-
ence relatively more job loss as a result of nationally centralized programming. Syndica-
tion and voice tracking have developed within larger firms, which tend to have holdings
in larger markets.20 Larger markets, in turn, tend have less concentrated ownership than
smaller markets, on average. Together these facts suggest that less consolidated markets
might experience more of the job loss caused by national centralization. On the other
hand, if a consolidating firm happens to locate some of its centralized operations in a
particular market, that city might retain (or even gain) radio jobs. Syndicated shows
and voice-tracked programs employ at least a few people and have to locate somewhere.
Radio firms may choose to centralize operations in larger metropolitan areas, result-
ing in more job losses within small markets, which generally have more concentrated
ownership. In general, the location of jobs after a firm implements more nationally
centralized programming will depend on the firm’s particular strategy, its existing em-
ployment allocations across stations, and other hard-to-measure factors. Thus, national
centralization may influence the correlation between local-market consolidation and job
loss positively or negatively. Overall, however, based on the impact of the various forms
20This observation stems from a series of cross-tabulations of indicator variables for holdings of large
firms versus concentration ratios in local markets. Source: BIA Financial Networks, Media Access Pro,
data as of May 16, 2002.
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of local centralization discussed above, one would predict that greater consolidation in
a local market should lead to lower employment levels in that market.
4.3 Regulatory Framework
Achieving the FCC’s goals of competition, diversity, and localism in media requires
attention to what happens in media and communications industry labor markets. The
employment levels and wages of those in radio-industry occupations are highly rele-
vant to whether broadcasters have to resources to serve local communities adequately.
Employment issues relate most closely to localism, although they can also influence
diversity.The notion that employing local residents may contribute to community re-
sponsiveness runs through many of the public debates over issues like syndication and
nationalization. Lower wages could indirectly decrease the quality of local radio pro-
gramming by providing talented media employees with less incentive to work in ra-
dio. Labor-market issues also affect diversity, particularly viewpoint diversity, since job
losses mean fewer participants in media production and fewer participants means fewer
viewpoints.
Phillip Napoli has identified two major strains within policymakers’ and scholars’
thinking about the goal of localism.21 Both can accommodate a concern for what occurs
in the labor markets for radio occupations. The first theory conceives of localism geo-
graphically. As Napoli explains, under this theory “any program produced and presented
within a local community would be seen as contributing to the fulfillment of the local-
21PHILIP M. NAPOLI, FOUNDATIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS POLICY: PRINCIPLES AND PROCESS
IN THE REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA 209–224 (2001).
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ism ideal.”22 This geographic conception depends on local production and thus on local
employees. In this way, local labor markets become highly relevant to the localism goal,
with job losses thwarting its achievement. The second theory focuses more on content;
in this conception “the localism principle is only fulfilled if the programming addresses
the unique needs and interests of the local community.”23 Whether radio employees are
local to a geography (such as a city, town, or metropolitan area) will relate to the second
conception of localism under two conditions: (a) if one decides that geographic defini-
tions of “community” remain important despite mass-media technology, perhaps in light
of state and local politics; and (b) if one thinks that radio employees’ physical presence
in a community will promote responsiveness to community needs. This article will not
address whether those two conditions hold. But if those conditions did hold true, then
the employment effects of radio consolidation would matter a great deal for localism.
Historically, the FCC has scrutinized the organization and location of work in media
industries, so labor-market issues have always been part of the localism goal, whether
directly or indirectly. Section 307(b) of the Communications Act, which the Senate has
recently called the “pole star” of telecommunications regulation,24directs:
In considering applications for licenses, and modifications and renewals
thereof, when and insofar as there is demand for the same, the Commission
shall make such distribution of licenses, frequencies, hours of operation,
and of power among the several States and communities as to provide a fair,
22Id. at 210.
23Id. at 212.
24Preservation of Localism, Program Diversity, and Competition in Television Broadcast Service Act,
S. 1046, 108th Cong. (2003).
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efficient, and equitable distribution of radio service to each of the same.25
By directing the FCC to consider “communities” and the distribution of licenses among
them, the statute created a foundation for considering whether stations serve local com-
munities well. When the FCC still conducted initial assignment hearings, two of the
seven factors required applicants to show that “there is a need for the proposed broad-
cast station in the community” and that they “will be responsive to local community
needs.”26 These factors related to employment issues only indirectly. But in compara-
tive hearings, the FCC would consider the “full-time participation in station operation
by owners” and explained that “[w]hile . . . integration of ownership and management is
important per se, its value is increased if the participating owners are local residents.”27
The FCC argued that local residents could respond to changing community needs better
than non-locals. Thus, in the days of licensing hearings, FCC policy connected the lo-
calism goal to the geographic location of station employees, specifically the day-to-day
managers.
Decades later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck down the in-
tegration criterion for ownership and management in 1993 in Bechtel v. FCC,28 and
Congress and the FCC have done away with comparative licensing hearings.29 But
2547 U.S.C. §307(b) (2000).
26STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 85 (1st ed. 2001).
The seven-factor test grew out of the FCC’s interpretation of Section 308 of the Communications Act,
which “requires that applicants demonstrate ‘citizenship, character, and financial, technical, and other
qualifications.’ ” Id. at 84–85 (quoting 47 U.S.C. §308(b) (2000)). The catch-all phrase other qualifica-
tions permitted the FCC to consider localism.
27Id. at 87-88 (quoting FCC Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 FCC 2d 393
(1965)).
2810 F.3d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
29See BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 144–147.
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those particular decisions do not prohibit the FCC from considering labor-market issues
in other ways in the course of regulating broadcast. The norms behind the former inte-
gration preference survive in the two theories described above, not to mention the ideals
still reflected in Section 307(b). If eliminating the national radio ownership limit and
relaxing local radio ownership limits led to detrimental effects on localism and diversity,
then the FCC can and should examine them. The court in Bechtel had a multi-pronged
rationale for overturning the integration preference, including concerns about the par-
ticular implementation of the FCC’s policy and the ease of circumventing it.30 Most
importantly, the court wanted to see some kind of empirical evidence to support the
FCC’s policy,31 a common theme in recent administrative-law reviews of FCC policy.32
Suppose, for example, that the FCC collected empirical evidence linking consolidation
to job loss, and coupled it with evidence associating local employees with responsive-
ness to their geographic community. Then, in accordance with its localism goal, the
FCC could take action (such as maintaining or even reducing ownership caps) and have
a strong argument that a reviewing court should show deference to its decision.
Recently the FCC launched a Localism Task Force “to gather empirical data on
broadcast localism, and to advise the Commission on concrete steps to promote this
significant policy goal.”33 The commission announced its intentions to investigate some
30Bechtel, 10 F.3d at 885–86.
31Bechtel, 10 F.3d at 880 (“Despite its twenty-eight years of experience with the policy, the Commission
has accumulated no evidence to indicate that it achieves even one of the benefits that the Commission
attributes to it.”).
32See, e.g., Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
33Federal Communications Commission, Notice of Inquiry, No. 04-129, ¶6 (June 7, 2004).
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of the issues discussed above, such as voice tracking,34 national playlists,35 diminished
political news coverage,36 and disaster warnings.37 In this chapter, I study the labor
markets for the very occupations involved in these policy debates: on-air announcers
(including disk jockeys), broadcast news reporters, and broadcast technicians. Thus the
employment effects of radio consolidation provide the FCC with another angle from
which to research the issues it has recently deemed most important for achieving the
ideal of localism.
4.4 Labor Market Trends
General labor-market trends in employment and wages in radio provide context for ana-
lyzing the labor-market effects of radio consolidation. The Current Employment Statis-
tics survey (CES), conducted and published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) can
provide a broad overview. Figure 4.1 shows industry-wide employment levels over time
for the radio industry as well as the television industry, for comparison.38 (The dotted
line marks the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.) From this chart, it
appears that radio employment has stagnated, while from 1992 onward television em-
ployment has increased. This may reflect factors beyond radio deregulation, such as the
upsurge of cable television along with cable music channels.





38Source: Current Employment Statistics survey, data from 1982–2004, at http://www.bls.gov/ces/ (last
visited March 1, 2005).
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in the U.S.39 It appears that the late 1980s and early 1990s actually brought about the
most significant decrease in employment per station over the past two decades. From
1988 to 1995, employment per station dropped from 11.65 to 9.54, an 18.1 percent
decrease. In the period following the Telecommunications Act of 1996, employment per
station has continued to drop (from 9.54 to 8.70), but by only 8.8 percent. The decline
between 1988 and 1995 might be explained by the incremental steps of deregulation that
occurred in 1984 and 1992, that is, the gradual relaxation of both the national and local
radio ownership limits. The precipitous decline may also signify a period of sagging
financial outcomes for radio firms; the Telecommunications Act was pitched as a way
to rescue ailing radio firms.40
Real wages in the radio industry show a steady upward trend over the past two
decades, as illustrated in Figure 4.3.41 Over the period from 1995 to 2004, real wages in-
creased 38.7 percent; this compares to 3.3 percent increase from 1988 to 1995. Macroe-
conomic trends have no doubt influenced these figures, but it appears from the aggregate
statistics that since the Telecommunications Act of 1996, employment per station in the
radio industry has declined a total of about nine percent while real wages have risen by
almost thirty-nine percent.
In sum, total employment in the radio industry has been steady. But this, together
with the growth in the number of licensed stations, means that employment per station
39Sources: Current Employment Statistics survey, data from 19822002; BIA Financial Networks, Me-
dia Access Pro, data as of May 16, 2002.
40See PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE, COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996, at 48-49 (1999).
41Sources: Current Employment Statistics survey, data from 1982–2002; annual CPI from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics.
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has declined over the past two decades. On average, each radio licensee utilizes fewer
labor resources to produce its programming. The regulatory changes of 1996 came at
a time when job losses already occurred fairly frequently; this accords with anecdotal
accounts. Real wages, in contrast, have increased sharply in the years following the
Telecommunications Act.
4.5 Data Sources
Consolidation rarely occurs in a quick, coordinated way. This makes it difficult, in
general, to isolate the effects of consolidation on labor market outcomes. But in the radio
industry, the removal of certain regulations directly limiting the size of firms resulted in
an industry-wide wave of consolidation within a relatively short period of time. Change
has occurred at a fast pace in radio since the passage of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, as shown by the time series of station acquisitions displayed in Figure 4.4.42
The brisk pace of mergers and the resulting concentration of ownership provides
a source of variation. Different markets started from different levels of concentration
and experienced consolidation at different rates over time. Using this variation in con-
solidation, I use ownership concentration as an explanatory variable in a series of panel
regressions with employment and wages as the outcomes. Figure 4.4 shows that the pace
of consolidation peaked in 1996–1997 and slowed by 2001–2002. Since the change in
consolidation occurred over a relatively brief span of time, one can hope that fewer un-
observed, confounding factors have influenced consolidation, employment and wages,
42Source: BIA Financial Networks, Media Access Pro, data as of May 16, 2002.
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or their relationship.
The Occupational Employment Survey (OES), conducted by the BLS, contains data
on employment and wages, broken down by occupation and by metropolitan statistical
area (MSA), in non-agricultural industries. In 1998, the BLS began conducting the OES
on a yearly basis, rather than once every three years.43 In 2003, the OES shifted again,
to a twice-yearly format. Each release of the OES contains data looking back on three
years. In this article I use OES data from the 1998 release through the November 2003
release; thus, I have employment and wage data from 1996 to late 2003. The advantage
of the OES data for studying the radio industry is that three occupations of interest can
be studied: (1) announcers; (2) news analysts, reporters, and correspondents (“news
reporters”); and (3) broadcast technicians. Table 4.1 displays some summary statistics
on the OES occupational data; note that until recently the OES aggregated radio and
television into one industry group.44
I merged the OES data with information from BIA Financial Networks’ Media Ac-
cess Pro (Radio Version) database, which contains information about every radio station
in the U.S., including ownership history, ratings, and estimated revenue. The database
classifies stations by “Arbitron markets,” geographical areas roughly corresponding to
MSAs used by the Arbitron Company.45 I matched MSAs with Arbitron markets wher-
43Starting in 1998, each year, BLS surveyed at least some establishments; some of the smaller individ-
ual establishments were surveyed on a rotating basis once every three years.
44Source: Occupational Employment Survey, data from 1998 through Nov. 2003.
45The Arbitron Company identifies over 280 markets (cities and metropolitan areas) in which it con-
ducts surveys on radio listenership. These markets are ranked according to population, from New York
City (#1) to Casper, Wyoming (#285). I will use and refer to these 280-plus “Arbitron markets” through-
out my analysis. Arbitron markets differ from MSAs because of some adjustments based on industry
practice and marketing considerations.
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ever possible to produce a panel data set with 246 markets and 7 time periods (1998
through 2002, plus May 2003 and November 2003). Since the OES does not survey
firms in every market about every occupation in every year, several of the potential ob-
servations in the panel are missing.
The panel data set I constructed has four main drawbacks. First, while the OES
samples about 400,000 establishments each year, the sample sizes for an individual oc-
cupation in a particular market-year combination can be tiny (or zero, when the market-
year observation is missing). Second, to use the occupational data in the OES, one must
look at all individuals in a given occupation, not just the individuals in one industry-
occupation combination. In other words, the outcome variables I use include some
employees from non-radio industries, potentially confounding the effects of radio con-
solidation on radio employment, especially in the news reporters occupation. Third, the
OES reports data only at the market levelso one cannot disaggregate the data to study
issues like the employment effects when two previously independent stations come un-
der common ownership. Fourth, both the OES and Media Access Pro data sets begin
in 1996, eliminating the potential for pre/post analysis of the Telecommunications Act.
Despite these disadvantages, the panel data provide a number of interesting insights.
4.6 Econometric Approach
The unit of observation in my analysis is a market-year combination. As described
above, the data set includes 246 markets and 7 time periods, with many market-year
observations missing due to the nature of the OES. The labor-market outcome variables
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I analyze come in three groups of three: the number of employees, the mean hourly
wage, and the median wage for announcers, news reporters, and broadcast technicians.
Sample sizes vary by both occupation and the particular outcome in question, again as
a result of the OES survey methodology.
I study three explanatory variables for each market-year combination: number of
stations, stations per owner, and the variance of stations owned. First, the number of
radio stations in a market should affect employment simply because, all else equal, more
stations will require more employees. I include both commercial and non-commercial
stations, since both for-profit and non-profit employees can show up in the OES data.
Second, the number of stations in a market divided by the number of firms owning
stations provides a measure of consolidation. I will refer to this variable as stations
per owner, but it is important to remember that the variable is measured locally; stations
owned in other markets are not taken into account. Third, the variance of stations owned
by each firm within a market measures a second-order effect of consolidation that may
relate to labor-market outcomes in the presence of economies of scale. Consider two
markets, A and B, each with 20 total stations and each with 5 stations per owner. The
holdings of the four owners in these hypothetical markets could differ considerably. For
instance, in market A, each owner might have 5 stations, while in market B, two owners
have 9 stations and two owners have just 1 station. The variance of stations owned
captures such differences in ownership structure within markets.
Table 4.2 reports summary statistics for the panel data set.46 Because the OES em-
46Sources: Occupational Employment Survey, data from 1998 through Nov. 2003; BIA Financial
Networks, Media Access Pro, data as of May 16, 2002.
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ployment data include a greater number of missing values than the OES wage data,
the sample sizes vary. Thus, Table 4.2 contains two sets of summary statistics for the
outcome variables, one corresponding to the employment regressions and one corre-
sponding to the wage regressions.
Because the data set is a panel, I can estimate multiple types of models to measure
the effect of consolidation on employment and wages. I start with a pair of pooled re-
gressions, which treat each market-year observation as independent, essentially ignoring
the panel nature of the data set.47 The first of the pooled regressions uses only two ex-
planatory variables (the number of stations and stations per owner); the second adds the
variance of stations owned. Next, I estimate a similar model, using all three explanatory
variables, but control for year-specific effects. Finally, I estimate a fixed effects model
by adding to the year-specific effects a full set of market-specific indicators.
Stated more formally, for each of the three occupations and each of the three outcome
variables, I estimate four types of models:
(4.1) ymt = w
′
mtγ + εmt
(4.2) ymt = x
′
mtβ + εmt












where ymt denotes the outcome variable in question (employment, mean hourly wage,
or median hourly wage); wmt denotes a shortened vector of explanatory variables (just
47See JACK JOHNSTON & JOHN DINARDO, ECONOMETRIC METHODS 390 (4th ed. 1997).
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number of stations and stations per owner); xmt denotes the full vector of explanatory
variables (number of stations, stations per owner, and variance of stations owned); dt
denotes a vector of year indicators; λt denotes year-specific fixed effects; dm denotes a
vector of market indicators; αm denotes market-specific fixed effects; and εmt denotes
the error term.
The pooled regressions serve as a sort of baseline for comparison. Their coefficient
estimates are based on both cross-sectional variation and variation over time. Including
year-specific effects, which control for industry-wide time trends, allows one to focus on
cross-sectional variation as well as deviations from time trends within particular local
markets. The fixed-effects model that also controls time-specific effects has the ad-
vantage of allowing one to ignore any omitted variables that do not change over time
(but do vary across individuals) as well as any omitted variables that do not vary across
individuals (but do change over time).48 This approach, in other words, attempts to
avoid the common problem of omitted variable bias.49 Since many unobservable factors
influence radio firms’ employment decisions, as discussed above, I try to address the
omitted-variable-bias issue with a fixed-effects approach.
4.7 Results
Striking results emerge from the pooled regressions and the regressions including year-
specific effects in Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5.50 Estimates from the pooled regressions and
48See PAUL RUUD, AN INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL ECONOMETRIC THEORY 625 (2000).
49See Johnston & DiNardo, supra note 47, at 395.
50Sources: Occupational Employment Survey, data from 1998 through Nov. 2003; BIA Financial
Networks, Media Access Pro, data as of May 16, 2002.
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the regressions including year-specific effects are broadly similar. The total number of
stations variable has a positive correlation with employment, as expected. Markets with
more stations also had higher hourly wages (both mean and median), perhaps reflecting
the higher cost of living in larger markets.
Greater consolidation, as measured by stations per owner, has a negative and statisti-
cally significant association with employment of both news reporters and broadcast tech-
nicians. (The coefficient on stations per owner in column (3) of Table 4.3 for announcers
is negative but not statistically significant.) The relationship between employment and
consolidation is also economically meaningful: a 1 percent increase in consolidation
was associated with a 1.5 percent decline in employment of news reporters and a 0.8
percent decline in employment of broadcast technicians. Suppose that model (3), with
year-specific effects, is the correct model of a radio market, allowing one to estimate
the true causal effect of consolidation on employment. In the average Arbitron market,
stations per owner increased by about 36 percent between 1996 and 2003.51 So in an
average market, according to the estimates in column (3) of Table 4.3, employment of
news reporters would have declined by 56 percent and employment of broadcast tech-
nicians by 30 percent over this time period (if all other variables remained unchanged),
signifying very large job losses.
Consolidation also has a negative and statistically significant correlation with mean
hourly wages, for both news reporters and announcers, and with median hourly wages
for news reporters. In the context of large wage increases industry-wide, as shown in
51Source: BIA Financial Networks, Media Access Pro, data as of May 16, 2002.
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Table 4.3 above, this means that markets with more ownership consolidation experi-
enced smaller wage increases. Stations per owner has an estimated coefficient of -0.33
for announcers and -0.28 for news reporters, as shown in column (3) of Table 4.4. Using
these estimates and making the same assumption as above about the veracity of model
(3), it appears that wages for announcers and news reporters in an average market are 12
percent and 10 percent lower, respectively, as a result of radio consolidation.
The fixed-effects estimates in column (4) of Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 complicate this
picture. Only one of the estimates for the coefficients on stations per owner remains
statistically significant after including market-specific indicator variables. (The neg-
ative association between consolidation and median hourly wages for news reporters
remains statistically significant at the five percent level.) This shows that cross-sectional
variation provided most of the identification in the regressions with only year-specific
effects. In other words, differences across markets, rather than within markets, appear to
have generated the negative correlations between consolidation and employment and be-
tween consolidation and wages. The fixed-effects regressions do not support the causal
inference that if consolidation increased over time (for some reason exogenous to the
workings of the market) in a particular local market, job loss and lower wages would
result in that particular market. Rather, the shift in the results from the year-specific-
effects model to the fixed-effects model only demonstrate a cross-sectional relationship
between consolidation and job loss and between consolidation and lower wages.
On the other hand, the fixed-effects estimates have some potential problems. The
OES data may be too incomplete (that is, they may contain too many missing values) to
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generate statistically significant estimates based solely on within-market variation over
time. Because it uses a full set of indicator variables for markets and years, the fixed-
effects model may ask too much of the OES data. Furthermore, fixed-effects models in
general are highly sensitive to measurement error in the explanatory variable.52 While
the data on station ownership histories from Media Access Pro are fairly reliable, they
may not be perfect. More importantly, the combination of Media Access Pro and OES
may introduce something akin to measurement error. Since the OES only surveys a
subset of firms in a market in a given year, it may be that the most appropriate x variables
would reflect the number of stations owned by those particular firms, the stations per
owner actually surveyed by OES, and so on. Instead, the x variables include market-
wide measures that may not correspond properly to the y variables in a particular market-
year, since the identities of the firms surveyed by OES are unavailable. This kind of
measurement error might even attenuate (bias toward zero) the estimates somewhat in
the pooled and year-specific-effects models, but would introduce stronger attenuation
bias in the fixed-effects model.
Even taking the fixed-effects estimates as accurate, the pooled regressions and the
regressions with only year-specific effects suggest a strong cross-sectional correlation
between greater consolidation and lower employment and wages. This may reflect
economic relationships between the variables that pre-date the 1996–2003 period of
study. Radio ownership limits, both national and local, began to increase gradually in
the 1980s. So a causal relationship between consolidation and employment (and be-
52See JOHNSTON & DINARDO, supra note 47, at 399-401.
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tween consolidation and wages) may exist, though it may have commenced operating
more than a decade before the time period I have been able to study using the OES and
Media Access Pro. One can conclude from the regressions that more consolidated mar-
kets, controlling for the number of stations as well as year-specific effects, have lower
employment levels and lower wages than less consolidated markets do.
4.8 Conclusion
Labor-market outcomes have not often, if ever, received explicit empirical scrutiny in
discussions of broadcast media regulation. Yet many issues important to legislators,
scholars, activists, and FCC regulatorssyndication, voice tracking, emergency broad-
cast warnings, nationalized music programming, and local news coveragehave impor-
tant labor-economic aspects. Under the rubric of localism, especially, but also in the
context of promoting viewpoint diversity, the FCC can and should monitor job losses
and wage reductions in radio-industry occupations. The empirical analysis in this arti-
cle, controlling for the number of stations and industry-wide time trends, demonstrates
that more consolidated markets have fewer radio announcers, news reporters, and broad-
cast technicians. Job losses in these professions indicate that fewer local residents make
decisions now about what music to play and what stories to report. The employment
effects of radio consolidation thus represent a threat to both localism and diversity.53
53This chapter originally appeared in a slightly different form in the edited volume MEDIA DIVERSITY

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Sample Sizes
  Occupation  





Employment 183 275 196 — 
 (215) (426) (360)  
 [1067] [966] [811]  
Mean Hourly Wage ($) 13.08 17.47 13.80 — 
 (3.77) (4.35) (3.50)  
 [1278] [1114] [891]  
Median Wage ($) 10.24 15.13 12.37 — 
 (2.58) (3.90) (3.56)  
Outcome 
Variables 
 [1278] [1114] [891]  
Total Stations in Market 32.7 35.0 37.8 27.0 
 (17.9) (18.6) (18.3) (16.6) 
 [1067] [966] [811] [2023] 
Stations per Owner 1.81 1.83 1.83 1.82 
 (0.356) (0.356) (0.342) (0.395) 
 [1067] [966] [811] [2023] 
Variance of Stations Owned 2.11 2.28 2.29 2.10 




 [1067] [966] [811] [2022] 
Total Stations in Market 32.0 34.1 37.4 27.0 
 (17.5) (18.1) (18.2) (16.6) 
 [1278] [1114] [891] [2023] 
Stations per Owner 1.81 1.82 1.83 1.82 
 (0.360) (0.358) (0.345) (0.395) 
 [1278] [1114] [891] [2023] 
Variance of Stations Owned 2.09 2.23 2.33 2.10 




 [1278] [1114] [891] [2022] 
 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses; sample sizes in smaller font and brackets. 
 
142
Table 4.3: Employment as the Outcome Variable
 
  Model 
Occupation Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Announcers Total Stations in Market 1.25** 1.26** 1.25** -0.280 
   (N = 1067)  (0.077) (0.082) (0.082) (0.416) 
 Stations per Owner -0.401** -0.307 -0.268 -0.112 
  (0.143) (0.294) (0.296) (0.212) 
 Variance of Stations Owned — -0.027 -0.033 -0.012 
   (0.070) (0.076) (0.045) 
 Year Effects No No Yes Yes 
 Market Effects No No No Yes 
   R2 0.560 0.560 0.567 0.905 
News Reporters Total Stations in Market 1.39** 1.33** 1.36** -0.124 
   (N = 966)  (0.098) (0.100) (0.097) (0.402) 
 Stations per Owner -1.04** -1.58** -1.56** 0.026 
  (0.212) (0.336) (0.337) (0.191) 
 Variance of Stations Owned — 0.162* 0.062 0.042 
   (0.075) (0.081) (0.040) 
 Year Effects No No Yes Yes 
 Market Effects No No No Yes 
  R2 0.590 0.595 0.614 0.947 
Broadcast  Total Stations in Market 1.42** 1.39** 1.38** 0.104 
Technicians  (0.111) (0.119) (0.119) (0.541) 
   (N = 811) Stations per Owner -0.582** -0.855* -0.838* -0.172 
  (0.181) (0.332) (0.337) (0.252) 
 Variance of Stations Owned — 0.082 0.117 0.039 
   (0.083) (0.095) (0.050) 
 Year Effects No No Yes Yes 
 Market Effects No No No Yes 
  R2 0.555 0.556 0.560 0.927 
 
** denotes significant at the 1% level; * denotes significant at the 5% level. 
Notes: All variables in natural logarithms.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 4.4: Mean Hourly Wages as the Outcome Variable
  
  Model 
Occupation Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Announcers Total Stations in Market 0.225** 0.192** 0.210** 0.075 
   (N = 1278)  (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.170) 
 Stations per Owner -0.037 -0.302* -0.334** 0.021 
  (0.073) (0.118) (0.116) (0.092) 
 Variance of Stations Owned — 0.078** 0.027 -0.008 
   (0.029) (0.031) (0.019) 
 Year Effects No No Yes Yes 
 Market Effects No No No Yes 
  R2 0.173 0.186 0.262 0.757 
News Reporters Total Stations in Market 0.192** 0.149** 0.165** 0.327 
   (N = 1114)  (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.180) 
 Stations per Owner 0.083 -0.285** -0.277* -0.145 
  (0.061) (0.108) (0.108) (0.089) 
 Variance of Stations Owned — 0.110** 0.061** -0.002 
   (0.026) (0.027) (0.018) 
 Year Effects No No Yes Yes 
 Market Effects No No No Yes 
  R2 0.169 0.204 0.270 0.773 
Broadcast  Total Stations in Market 0.196** 0.178** 0.189** 0.408 
Technicians  (0.041) (0.045) (0.043) (0.242) 
   (N = 891) Stations per Owner -0.001 -0.149 -0.143 0.056 
  (0.074) (0.161) (0.159) (0.114) 
 Variance of Stations Owned — 0.045 -0.011 -0.034 
   (0.035) (0.35) (0.023) 
 Year Effects No No Yes Yes 
 Market Effects No No No Yes 
  R2 0.140 0.145 0.197 0.763 
 
** denotes significant at the 1% level; * denotes significant at the 5% level. 




Table 4.5: Median Hourly Wages as the Outcome Variable
 
  Model 
Occupation Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Announcers Total Stations in Market 0.115** 0.091** 0.106** 0.060 
   (N = 1278)  (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.168) 
 Stations per Owner 0.031 -0.166 -0.189 0.135 
  (0.066) (0.106) (0.105) (0.091) 
 Variance of Stations Owned — 0.058* 0.013 -0.024 
   (0.025) (0.027) (0.019) 
 Year Effects No No Yes Yes 
 Market Effects No No No Yes 
  R2 0.062 0.072 0.147 0.681 
News Reporters Total Stations in Market 0.155** 0.107** 0.122** 0.186 
   (N = 1114)  (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.197) 
 Stations per Owner 0.040 -0.360** -0.355** -0.246* 
  (0.059) (0.104) (0.104) (0.098) 
 Variance of Stations Owned — 0.120** 0.076** 0.039 
   (0.026) (0.027) (0.020) 
 Year Effects No No Yes Yes 
 Market Effects No No No Yes 
  R2 0.107 0.148 0.201 0.729 
Broadcast  Total Stations in Market 0.207** 0.199** 0.208** 0.369 
Technicians  (0.040) (0.043) (0.042) (0.299) 
   (N = 891) Stations per Owner -0.027 -0.095 -0.084 0.184 
  (0.073) (0.154) (0.152) (0.142) 
 Variance of Stations Owned — 0.021 -0.034 -0.059* 
   (0.035) (0.037) (0.028) 
 Year Effects No No Yes Yes 
 Market Effects No No No Yes 
  R2 0.133 0.134 0.173 0.695 
 
** denotes significant at the 1% level; * denotes significant at the 5% level. 






The three papers compiled in this dissertation have a common theme: they each study
the effect of law and regulation on creative products. The two industries studied are
the radio industry (where the product is a programming format) and the music industry
(where the product is a work of music). Although the methodologies range from applied
economic theory to econometric estimation, the core theme is determining how govern-
ment policies—specifically telecommunications regulation and copyright law—affect
creativity in the media and entertainment industries.
Chapter 2 concerns radio concentration in the wake of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996. In that legislation, Congress increased the limits on how many radio stations
one firm can own within a single “radio market.” To enforce these limits, the FCC used
an idiosyncratic method of defining radio markets, based on the complex geometry of
the signal contour patterns of radio stations’ broadcasts. Using a unique geographic
data set, Chapter 2 provides the first calculations of the pre- and post-1996 limits on
local radio ownership as actually implemented by the FCC. The limits are surprisingly
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permissive and vary considerably from city to city. While the limits were seldom bind-
ing on radio firms, I find a strong correlation between the 1996 increase in the limits and
the increase in ownership concentration over the following five years. I use this corre-
lation and the variation in the limits as a natural experiment in increased concentration
to study the effects of concentration on various radio-market outcomes. The chapter’s
estimates can contribute to an assessment of the FCC’s quasi-antitrust regime for radio
and suggest that concentration has a positive effect on advertising revenue and the vari-
ety of programming formats but no effect on listenership. Finally, the chapter lays the
groundwork for future research that will use the FCC’s implementation of local radio
ownership limits as a case study in the administrative process.
Chapter 3 studies copyright law as applied to digital sampling. All musical creation
builds on previous works, but using fragments of existing pieces of music can consti-
tute copyright infringement. A recent case has strengthened copyright protection for
samples of sound recordings, in particular, by lowering the size threshold for protection
to zero. This paper describes a model of copyright holders’ and samplers’ incentives
that captures an important inefficiency emerging from the sequential creation context.
Bargaining may not divide the profit from the sample-based derivative work between
upstream and downstream creators in a way that provides musicians in both groups with
sufficient incentives to create. The model suggests that attempting to “maximize” the
property rights of copyright holders to increase incentives for creation can backfire. Be-
cause the specific bargaining process, and not ex ante efficiency, dictates the results of
licensing negotiations, copyright can discourage socially desirable creative works. An
147
optimal system for regulating sequential creation would balance the incentives of up-
stream and downstream creators, to the benefit of both groups.
Chapter 4 contains estimates of the effect of increased ownership concentration on
labor markets. Local radio markets with higher ownership concentration employ fewer
radio announcers, news reporters, and broadcast technicians. Moreover, those profes-
sions experienced smaller wage increases in more concentrated markets. These results
suggest that increased concentration poses a threat to localism in radio as large firms
shift away from hiring local employees and toward centralized staffing.
In sum, from the labor market to the product market, and from the studio to the
record store, law shapes creativity.
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